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Negotiations of seduction, negotiations of need, and negotiations of 
men’s desire move dancers and customers to the lap dance room, 
where an erotic assembly line of men sit side-by side, two feet from 
each other, with women dancing on their laps for twenty to forty 
dollars a song, depending on whether their g-string is on or off.1 
The “erotic assembly line” in strip clubs that Danielle Egan 
describes evokes images of Fordist-era production lines where side-
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1 R. DANIELLE EGAN, DANCING FOR DOLLARS AND PAYING FOR LOVE: THE 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EXOTIC DANCERS AND THEIR REGULARS 23 (2006). 
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by-side factory workers mechanically, uniformly, with measured 
regularity, and often monotonous movement go about their assigned 
tasks.2 While areas allocated for lap dancing may vary among clubs 
according to the size of the premises and whatever the local zoning 
and building bylaws, licensing, and liquor licensing regulations 
require, the physical lay-out of semi-shielded seats in one section of 
the club appears to be a relatively common industry standard.3 
But apart from adopting specific spatial layouts suited to the 
increasingly diverse services they offer,4 clubs maximizing the 
numerical flexibility of labor may employ different workers to dance 
on stage, offer table dances and lap dances, or at times to perform 
these in shifts.5 Many strip clubs take a significant cut out of every 
individual dancer’s earnings, sometimes without even having to pay a 
minimum wage. Seen this way, the profits extracted from lap dances 
come to resemble the veritable “surplus value”6 of classic Marxist 
analyses. But strip clubs, by utilizing pools of freelance labor and 
“independent contractors,” have not only virtually eliminated the 
overhead cost of most dancers’ labor; in practice, clubs also charge 
dancers fees in exchange for permission to work in their clubs. 
However, by acknowledging individual lap dances as “negotiations 
of need and desire” between customers and dancers, Egan also 
highlights the complexities of the labor that comprises stripping and 
lap dancing. While the assembly line analogy tends to emphasize that 
 
2 Apart from using the “assembly line” analogy some exotic dancers also describe the 
sex work that they perform as the “fast food of the sex industry.” GREGOR GALL, SEX 
WORKER UNION ORGANISING: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 21 (2006). 
3 Separate rooms, which offer more “privacy,” (VIP or private rooms) are usually in a 
different section of the club and cost extra. 
4 Generally the two types of dances that became common for dancers to perform apart 
from their onstage performance are the table dance, where dancers perform at the 
customer’s table and lap dances, which by definition involve physical contact between the 
client and the dancer who gyrates on the customer’s lap. Lap dances usually take place in a 
secluded area of the club. Customers generally pay for dances (per song) and while most 
clubs charge a fee for the use of VIP or private rooms, the commission per song/dance and 
policy on tips will vary according to club policy and/or the employment arrangement. For 
more popular accounts about strip club practices in Toronto see Five Types of Dances in 
Toronto’s Strip Clubs, BARE FACTS: EXOTIC DANCER’S GUIDE TO THE LAP OF LUXURY 
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://museforallseasons.com/blog/2010/08/5-types-of-private-dances-in  
-toronto-strip-clubs/. 
5 Many clubs also rely on “free lancers” who only work tables and offer lap dances but 
do not perform on-stage. Some clubs target “amateurs” to perform on-stage. Sometimes 
clubs will specifically advertise “amateur night” to invite dancers to the club. 
6 Marx defines “surplus value” as the amount by which the value of the product exceeds 
the value of its constituent elements. 1 KARL MARX, DAS CAPITAL (Frederich Engels ed., 
Samuel Moore trans., 1st ed., 1887). 
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the “product” (the lap dance) looks the same because dancers may 
utilize similar movements and rely on a common repertoire of 
seduction and body parts, and at times offer similar “favors” to extract 
tips from customers, each lap dance occurs between individual 
women dancers and male clients and is defined by both the desires 
and needs of clients and the desires and needs or resistance of 
individual performers. Thus, the seemingly identical product is 
arguably never really quite identical. Chris Bruckert’s depiction of the 
strip club as a cultural and commercial anomaly, located “somewhere 
between bar and brothel,”7 also captures the paradoxical position of 
exotic dancing within most regulatory schemes. 
In a 2009 study, Natalya Timoshkina and Lynn McDonald 
estimated that about seventy five percent of exotic dancers working in 
Toronto’s strip clubs were foreign nationals.8 The same study finds 
that eighty to ninety percent of them come from Eastern Europe and 
Latin America and the rest from Asia.9 This Article is part of a 
broader inquiry into the notions of welfare, rights and social 
protection in Canada, and it focuses especially on those caught in 
what Laura Agustin has coined “no-rights zones”—migrant women in 
sex work, whose interests are not adequately represented under 
conventional rights claims as “workers” or as “victims.”10 For many 
migrant women exotic dancers in Toronto, the opportunity to earn as 
an exotic dancer may initially present itself partly because the local 
work force finds conditions of work and pay unacceptable,11 even 
deplorable.12 Agents of bar owners also go out of their way to recruit 
 
7 CHRIS BRUCKERT, TAKING IT OFF, PUTTING IT ON: WOMEN IN THE STRIP TRADE 33 
(2002). 
8 Natalya Timoshkina & Lynn McDonald, Building Partnerships for Service Provision 




10 Laura Agustin, Migrants in the Mistress’s House: Other Voices in the “Trafficking” 
Debate, 12 SOC. POL. 96, 112 (2005). 
11 While studies have shown that the majority of the women entering sex work know 
about the character of the job, many of them are misinformed about the rates of pay and 
additional requirements of the work such as lap-dancing. See LATIN AMERICAN 
COALITION TO END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, COMING TO DANCE, STRIVING TO 
SURVIVE: A STUDY ON LATIN AMERICAN MIGRANT EXOTIC DANCERS 29–30 (2002) 
[hereinafter LACEV]. 
12 Writing about the emergence of “lap dancing” in Toronto, Joe Chidley interviewed 
Katherine Goldberg, a former burlesque dancer who led the campaign to ban lap dancing 
in the same year. Among others, Goldberg noted the declining rates of pay with the entry 
of migrant workers stating that “newly arrived Thai women are working for just $1 a 
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dancers outside Canada.13 In the 1990s, strip club owners began 
complaining about the scarcity of recruits, noting, “Canadian women 
won’t take the job.”14 The arising paradox is a conflation of reward 
and risk that means potential opportunities for women outside of 
Canada who are looking for work, as well as the opportunity to travel 
and even migrate, but also more often than not accepting conditions 
of work and pay far worse than those available to non-foreign sex 
workers. Many migrant workers who take on the job as exotic dancers 
in Toronto’s clubs constantly walk a tightrope and assume risks that 
are literally now considered “part of the job.”15 Unlike their 
nonmigrant counterparts, exercising the option of whether or not to 
assume these risks is, by design, severely restricted, if not virtually 
impossible for migrant women in exotic dancing. For the dancers 
interviewed by the Latin American Coalition to End Violence Against 
Women and Children (LACEV), in addition to the restricted 
conditions of work, exposure to abuses by employers was particularly 
heightened at the time of their arrival in Canada and only gradually 
eased during the period of settlement and adjustment.16 In turn, 
migrant women exotic dancers who arrive and accept these conditions 
sometimes get blamed for the industry’s declining conditions of work 
and pay.17 The many contradictions arising from this situation are 
often debated in the context of sexuality, exploitation, 
commodification, labor and worker autonomy, but within the 
narrowing legal frame, issues tend to get whittled down to the 
singular one of legal regulation—often criminal regulation—and, 
more often now, immigration and sex trafficking laws. Only very 
marginally are they addressed as actual issues of work or labor. This 
gives rise to additional paradoxes. Purportedly protective police 
 
dance—the other $9 goes straight to the club-owners.” Joe Chidley, A No to Dirty 
Dancing, MACLEAN’S (Can.), July 1995, at 34–35. 
13 LACEV, supra note 11, at 13. 
14 Estanislao Oziewicz, Ottawa Eyes Curb on Entry of Strippers, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL (Can.), Feb. 1997, at 1. 
15 Risk as discussed in relation to the work of exotic dancers refers to both the grey 
areas of the job, such as engaging in physical contact with clients despite the city bylaw 
prohibiting it, and also the potential for abuse from both the customer and the employer. 
While all dancers are exposed to the risk of unwanted physical contact and abusive 
behavior by their customers, the levels of risk will vary accordingly in relation to a variety 
of factors—for example, the differences in the workplace, management policy, the 
presence of bouncers, customers, and even the individual dancer’s ability to protect 
herself. 
16 LACEV, supra note 11, at 45–46. 
17 Oziewicz, supra note 14. 
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measures like rescue missions18 end up limiting if not directly 
curtailing women’s mobility and their opportunity to earn. Such 
measures also restrict their autonomy with the result that liberal 
tolerance and an ethos of state deregulation, which are apparently 
supposed to promote free sexual expression secures freedom for some 
but not for others. 
My project proposes that focusing on sex work, in this case exotic 
dancing, as labor that is performed in Toronto by a predominantly 
female migrant work force also requires a much closer inquiry into 
the global processes of labor restructuring alongside immigration 
policy and anti-trafficking law, as well as into sexual regulation in 
general and the sexual entertainment industry in Canada, in particular. 
In this article, I propose a spatial analysis of labor restructuring as it 
has affected the exotic dancing industry by focusing on two key 
policy developments, which began in the 1980s and facilitated 
transformations in the business and labor of exotic dancing in Canada, 
particularly in the province of Ontario and the city of Toronto. 
As scholars have pointed out, “analytic specificity is important in 
critiques of the sex industry.”19 “Stripping requires a different kind of 
labor and occupies a different legal zone than prostitution.”20 As 
Bruckert observes, the different kinds of services and performances 
by exotic dancers in a single club now require different kinds of 
labor.21 
While this Article does not aim to contradict the existence of sex 
trafficking or to debunk a role for criminal law in such cases, it does 
take issue with the absolutist abolitionist framework of categorizing 
all instances of sex work as exploitation and accepts the argument 
advanced by sex workers that they are worse off because of policing 
and the current state of Canadian criminal law and more recently, 
 
18 Studies have noted how raids end up further victimizing women targeted for 
“rescue,” many women were arrested, detained and then perfunctorily deported often 
without ever being informed about the charges against them. See, e.g., TORONTO 
NETWORK AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN INCLUDING THAI 
MIGRANT SEX WORKERS IN CANADA (2000), available at http://www.mhso.ca/mhso 
/Trafficking_women.pdf; see also CHRISTINE BRUCKERT & COLETTE PARENT, ROYAL 
CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE ORGANIZED CRIME AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN 
CANADA: TRACING PERCEPTIONS AND DISCOURSES (2004). 
19 R. DANIELLE EGAN ET AL., FLESH FOR FANTASY: PRODUCING AND CONSUMING 
EXOTIC DANCE xvii (2006); see also Prabha Kotiswaran, Labours in Vice or Virtue? Neo-
liberalism, Sexual Commerce, and the Case of Indian Bar Dancing, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 105 
(2010). 
20 EGAN ET AL., supra note 19, at xvii. 
21 BRUCKERT, supra note 7. 
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anti-trafficking policy introduced as immigration reform.22 But while 
I take issue with the reliance on criminal law and police-led 
approaches to sex work in which sex workers are subjected to the 
most amount of regulation, this Article takes off from an observation 
by Prabha Kotiswaran that the “work” aspect in sex work remains 
under-theorized.23 In turn, I propose a preliminary unpacking of the 
assumptions behind legal claims for the extension of labor protection 
to exotic dancers in order to ask what these legal claims might mean 
for migrant women in Toronto’s exotic dancing industry. 
I further propose that in coming to grips with the legal regulation 
of the sexual, equating the question of the public/private dichotomy 
with a discussion about having “more or less” state regulation can 
ultimately be misleading,24 mainly because the argument frames a 
dichotomy between state and private business interests and regulation 
and control over exotic dancers.25 Indeed, unlike other laborers, 
whose employment rights and wages merit regulatory protection from 
the state, sex workers’ (in this case exotic dancers’) labor is subject to 
a different set of regulatory standards and belongs to a distinct 
governable space that resembles policing rather than social 
 
22 For a further discussion of the newly adopted anti-trafficking measures, see infra 
notes 32, 94–95 and accompanying text. Among many other sex workers groups in 
Canada, the Sex Professionals of Canada (SPW) supports a political platform to 
decriminalize sex work. While prostitution is not illegal in Canada per se, many acts 
related to prostitution are still punishable under Federal Criminal law. SPW is one of the 
leading organizations behind the case of Bedford v. Canada. In that case, Ontario’s 
Superior Court of Justice upheld the petitioner sex workers’ claim of unconstitutionality 
and struck down the Federal penal code provisions on keeping a bawdy house, living off 
the avails of prostitution and communicating for the purpose of prostitution. Bedford v. 
Canada (2010), 102 O.R. 3d 321 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.). While these particular provisions 
relate directly to prostitution, the “bawdy house” provision has been used against strip club 
owners and operators many times in the past. 
23 Citing Sunder Rajan, Kotiswaran notes that because the work position is under 
theorized, feminist discussions fall back into liberal discourse around choice, consent, 
work, and the market. Prabha Kotiswaran, Born Unto Brothels—Toward a Legal 
Ethnography of Sex Work in an Indian Red-Light Area, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 579, 581 
(2008) (citing RAJESWARI SUNDER RAJAN, THE SCANDAL OF THE STATE: WOMEN, LAW 
AND CITIZENSHIP IN POSTCOLONIAL INDIA (2003)). 
24 Carolina Ruiz-Austria, Outside, Hidden and in Between: Locating the Migrant Exotic 
Dancer in Canadian Legal Discourse and Regulatory Practice 10 6 OSGOODE RES. L. & 
POL. ECON., No. 20/2010, at 10 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1625857. 
25 Jane Scoular, What’s Law Got to Do With It? How and Why Law Matters in the 
Regulation of Sex Work, 37 J.L. SOC’Y 12, 24 (2010). In her approach to the study of the 
legal regulation of sex work, Scoular notes that law matters specifically in neoliberal 
settings in constructing the space, subjects, and systems of governance. 
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protection.26 Ultimately this means that the goal in pro-sex work 
politics, usually defined as the recognition of sex work as “legitimate 
labor” worthy of social protection, is something easier said than done. 
In reality, the practical aspect of subsuming sex work (in its myriad 
forms) under existing legal categories of employment and labor 
organization is fraught with difficulty.27 
While a central question in this broader project is how to theorize 
and critique emergent forms and exercises of state power over 
migrant sex workers,28 in this Article, I explore the ways in which 
spatiality can facilitate a deeper analysis of the relationship or 
convergence between public (state) and private (industry) regulatory 
practices that discipline the sex worker, especially when the sex 
worker is a foreigner or a migrant worker. In particular, I focus on the 
changing conditions of work and pay as part of the spatial 
restructuring process29 during a period when, as Bruckert notes, the 
industry shifted towards “services,” requiring dancers to employ 
considerably more, or an altogether different set of skills, face far 
 
26 Emily Van der Muelen & Elya Maria Durisin, Why Decrimminalize? How Canada’s 
Municipal and Federal Regulations Increase Sex Workers’ Vulnerability, 20 CAN. J. 
WOMEN & L. 289, 293 (2008) (Van der Muelen and Durisin point out that the labor-based 
understanding of sex work is a relatively new way of conceiving the of the sex industry.). 
27 Categories that make distinctions between permanent and temporary work as the 
basis for making benefits and social protections available are particularly problematic. In 
this Article, I concentrate on raising preliminary questions regarding the divisions between 
full-time and part-time workers, employees, and independent contractors, as well as those 
between local and foreign workers in Toronto’s exotic dancing industry as they relate to 
the question of access to rights and social protection. This is not to say, however, that such 
categories are fixed in labor law or that there are no possible exceptions. Harry Arthurs 
notes that part of what sets labor law apart from other fields of law is that it has been 
conducive to experimentation and alternative approaches. See, e.g., Harry Arthurs, Labour 
Law After Labour, 7 OSGOODE COMP. RES. L. & POL. ECON. No. 15/2011 (2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791868. 
28 Scoular, supra note 25, at 13–14. Scoular applies Foucault’s notion of 
“governmentality” to the study of sex work noting how “modern forms of legal power 
operate to support hegemonic power relations.” Arguing against the dismissals of law as 
irrelevant, Scoular seeks to highlight the productive and adaptive nature of power to 
demonstrate how law matters in a more complex manner than previously conceptualized 
within feminist analyses of sex work. 
29 The “spatial restructuring of labor processes” is taken from Wallace and Brady’s 
theorization of the social structures of accumulation (SSA), which involves the spatial 
division of labor, the threat of spatial relocation to diffuse workers’ resistance and 
fragment their interests along regional and national lines. Michael Wallace & David 
Brady, Globalization of Spatialization? The Worldwide Spatial Restructuring of the Labor 
Process, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM AND ITS CRISES: SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF 
ACCUMULATION THEORY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 121, 121–23 (Terrence McDonough, 
Michael Reich & David M. Kotz eds., 2010). 
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more danger, and experience more stress than their counterparts did 
twenty-five years ago.30 
Two aspects of labor reorganization which enabled transformations 
both of the work spaces and the actual work required of dancers in the 
exotic dancing industry figure prominently in the period between the 
1980s and 1990s—namely what Audrey Macklin observed as: (1) the 
geographic shift in recruitment and sourcing of “labor” in relation to 
meeting the demands of local Canadian markets for exotic dancing 
(i.e., from the United States as the primary source to the emergence of 
Eastern Europe and the Global South as the new primary sources) and 
(2) a shift of the literal job site “from the stage . . . [onto] men’s 
laps.”31 
My analysis focuses on the 1981 Ontario Labor Relations Board 
decision on a series of applications filed by the Canadian Association 
of Burlesque Entertainers (CABE) to represent dancers from various 
establishments, juxtaposed with an analysis of a series of cases in the 
1980s and 1990s, which highlight the shift from criminal policing to 
licensing as the dominant approach in the regulation of exotic dancing 
in Canada as well as consider the recent turn towards absolute 
prohibition through the introduction of policy banning foreign 
workers from both the adult entertainment and sex industry.32  I also 
interpret these policy developments alongside the 2002 case study on 
migrant exotic dancers by LACEV, Bruckert’s ethnographic account 
of exotic dancers labor in Canada between the 1980s and 1990s, and 
feminist research on union organizing by dancers’ organizations. 
I 
SPATIALIZING POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE 
PROBLEMATIZATION OF LAW 
My main interest in adopting a spatial approach is to offer a way 
out of the dichotomous position requiring a single explanation of sex 
work either as autonomous choice or exploitation by drawing 
attention to the specific “places” that migrant sex workers inhabit as 
well as the places to which they are relegated and the spaces to which 
 
30 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 96. 
31 Audrey Macklin, Dancing Across Borders: “Exotic Dancers,” Trafficking and 
Canadian Immigration Policy, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 464, 468 (2003). 
32 Minister Jason Kenney, Minister of Immigration and Multiculturalism, News 
Conference to Announce New Measures to Protect Vulnerable Foreign Workers from the 
Risk of Abuse and Exploitation, July 4, 2012, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english 
/department/media/speeches/2012/2012-07-04.asp. 
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they lack access.33 Within feminist politics, there is an urgent need to 
transcend the pre-framed debates about law, which posit a direct 
correspondence between the presence or absence of regulation, 
equating regulation by the state or an overemphasis on penal law with 
ending exploitation on one hand, and enabling autonomy in sex work 
simply by removing all kinds of state regulation, on the other.34 
Citing the work of Valverde and Rose, Jane Scoular offers the 
insight that in going beyond law’s positivist presentation as a unified 
phenomenon carried out by specialist institutions, viewing the 
governable spaces demarcated not just by law but by a whole range of 
regulatory agents as “spatializations” offers a more complex way of 
examining why and how law matters, and moves beyond the usual 
outside/inside or legal/illegal binaries.35 Transcending such binaries 
also facilitates a closer analysis of the constitution of public and 
private and helps to make sense of the hyper-regulation of the labor 
that is stripping/exotic dancing within the context of state de-
regulation through partial and de facto decriminalization. 
The application of spatial analysis in this project is akin to legal 
anthropology’s methodological identification of a legal field, and its 
analysis of plural rule networks which overlap and intersect with 
formal law. I propose that spatiality can help to transcend a strictly 
“functional” and “structural” analysis of law (and the legal 
institutions that create law) by offering “thick descriptions” of rule 
networks, normative fields and social structures within which legal 
rules are not only embedded but also co-constitutive of. 
Indeed one problem with this thesis of de-regulation is that it 
creates a picture of the liberal state stepping back and relinquishing 
control as though disappearing from its dominant (and active) role in 
the overall scheme of regulation, particularly in policing matters of 
sexual morality. Yet sex work (stripping in particular) is in fact hyper-
regulated and still heavily policed as a matter of course.36 Moreover, 
 
33 The reference to “place” here refers to both material and abstract aspects of social 
status/position. Sex workers/migrant workers are allowed access to a limited number of 
spaces and their mobility is usually limited (e.g., urban planning and zoning, sites of work, 
proscription of changing employers for temporary workers, sites of performance within the 
club such as stage, private rooms). Temporary migrant workers in general are usually less 
mobile than local workers not only in terms of being tied to a single establishment or 
employer but also in terms of not being allowed to undertake skills training and/or 
education. 
34 See Scoular, supra note 25, at 13. 
35 Id. at 29, 35. 
36 Ruiz-Austria, supra note 24, at 14–16. 
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accepting the de-regulation thesis tends to take the line between 
public and private, and what constitutes them, as something that is 
fixed and given instead of contingent. Spatial analysis can render the 
complex exclusionary effects of law and regulatory strategies, both 
public and private, including the overlaps between them, more visible. 
Likewise, within the exotic dancing business, which by itself is a 
diverse, highly class-stratified industry, spatiality enables a much 
more nuanced theorization of increasingly global markets and sex 
work which the conventional commodification thesis currently makes 
possible.37 
In her ethnographic work of stripping in Canada between the 1980s 
and 1990s, Bruckert makes initial sense of the transformation of the 
labor required from strippers by noting how “the stage receded as the 
primary site of labor in a strip club.”38 In fact, Bruckert makes many 
important observations about the transformation of the space of the 
strip club. Among others, she notes the centrality of “the floor” in the 
market place that is the strip club, as well as the emergence of 
“private or champagne rooms” which represented both new 
opportunities for earning and greater exposure to risk for dancers.39 
While Bruckert makes observations about the changing sites and 
requirements as well as conditions of labor in stripping, and links 
them with broader economic transformations, her work spans the 
period just before immigration for the purposes of working in 
Canada’s exotic dancing industry (particularly in Toronto) begins to 
figure significantly. 
Rather than attempting to resolve the various paradoxes in feminist 
theory and politics, taking a spatial approach presents a more modest 
lateral move to consider ways of rethinking the problem of law for 
 
37 One particularly dominant way of conceptualizing the exploitation and degradation 
in sex work is through the commodification thesis common to Marxist and Socialist 
feminist analysis, which posits the “spread of markets” into the intimate realms of life such 
as sexuality, as harmful. Sexuality scholars, especially historians will criticize this account 
not only for its linear depiction of the relationship between capitalism and the emergence 
of remunerated sexual labor, but also for how it depicts what is considered “sex work” as 
static over time and uniform across cultural contexts. For a discussion of feminist 
engagements of Marxist “commodification,” see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES (1996); Marjolein van der Veen, Rethinking Commodification and 
Prostitution: An Effort at Peacemaking in the Battles over Prostitution, 13 RETHINKING 
MARXISM 30 (2001). For a more general critique of how the relationship between 
capitalism and sexuality has been conceptualized, see also JEFFREY WEEKS, MAKING 
SEXUAL HISTORY 127–29 (2000). 
38 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 75. 
39 Id. at 78–81. 
2012] Profiteers of the Bump and Grind 213 
feminist theory and politics, particularly in relation to the sex work 
and trafficking debate.40 Jane Scoular notes that despite the depiction 
of legalization and abolitionism as politically oppositional, recent 
empirical work reveals, that “the difference in policy effects between 
these two positions is not as marked as rhetoric would suggest.”41 A 
number of feminists adopting political economic approaches to sex 
work are critical about the narrow terms of the debate between pro- 
sex work and abolitionist feminists, noting how both “ignore or tacitly 
reproduce the neoliberal assumptions about the free market and the 
benefits of globalization for women.”42 
Yet within conventional political economic analyses, accounts of 
law remain structural, where legal and policy contexts are presented, 
depending on both theoretical and ideological commitments, as 
contributing if not determining factors for shaping social and 
economic realities. Without denying that conventional structural 
analysis contributes a convenient descriptive model for discussing 
how laws and policies may sometimes function, such a conventional 
account remains problematic.43 First, it tends not only to reinforce the 
notion of law as completely discrete from the socioeconomic and 
political, but to present it as removed from the actual material context 
as well.44 Second, such structuralism continues to bear the imprint of 
causation and, as a result, tends to reify law-based and legality-
focused approaches.45 Applying spatiality extends the analysis of law 
and regulatory practice to material space or the literal places of sex 
work in order to present a materially grounded political and economic 
analysis, one that considers the actively contested boundaries of 
 
40 See, e.g., Linda McDowell, Spatializing Feminism: Geographic Perspectives, in 
BODYSPACE: DESTABILIZING GEOGRAPHIES OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY 28 (Nancy 
Duncan ed., 1996). 
41 Scoular, supra note 25, at 21; see also Sophie Day, The Law and the Market; 
Rhetorics of Exclusion and Inclusion Among London Prostitutes, in INSIDE AND OUTSIDE 
THE LAW 88 (Olivia Harris ed., 1996). 
42 Stephanie A. Limoncelli, The Trouble with Trafficking: Conceptualizing Women’s 
Sexual Labour and Economic Human Rights, 32 WOMEN’S STUD. INT. F. 261, 261 (2009); 
see also Marie Seagrave, Order at the Border: The Repatriation of Victims of Trafficking, 
32 WOMEN’S STUD. INT. F. 251 (2009). 
43 See Wallace & Brady, supra note 29. 
44 Scoular, supra note 25, at 25. 
45 Alan Hunt notes the tendency for a constructivist view of law within structuralism. 
Hunt points out the dominance of legal constructivism within classical theorizations of 
law, which are premised on nation-states/sovereignty, viewing law as a tool that can be 
and should be used by the state in regulating human affairs. See Alan Hunt, The 
Problematisation of Law in Classical Social Theory, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
SOCIAL THEORY 13 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2002). 
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regulatory spaces, by highlighting how law both in form and in 
practice is itself socially produced.46 Indeed, many scholars of urban 
geography note how “the overlapping policies, laws, and licensing 
procedures . . . have shaped the geographies of sex-related 
businesses.”47 But rather than just theorize law as an additional 
structuring layer that determines the contours of sex work, I want to 
draw particular attention to the overlaps between the spatiality of 
liberal law itself and the material and spatially oriented aspects of 
regulation. I also seek to highlight not just the authorship of courts in 
delineating and shaping public and private spaces in the regulation of 
the sexual in law, but also to underscore how adult entertainment 
businesses (and Toronto strip clubs in particular) constitute the 
regulatory discourse through their active engagement of regulatory 
regimes. The application of spatial analysis in this Article relates 
particularly to an analysis of the restructuring of the labor (and sites 
of labor) in stripping, in line with the insight that transformations in 
the labor process are a key-defining feature of neoliberalism in global 
economics.48 
II 
TOIL & TROUBLE: EXOTIC DANCERS AS LABOR’S AND RIGHTS’ 
MISFITS 
Today, the classification of sex workers including exotic dancers as 
“independent contractors” is widely taken for granted not only within 
the industry in the Canadian context49 but also within pro-sex work 
 
46 NICHOLAS K. BLOMELY, LAW, SPACE AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 51 (1994). 
(Blomely notes that law is crucial not only because law serves to produce space but also 
because law itself is shaped by the socio-spatial context.); see also DAVID DELANEY, THE 
SPATIAL, THE LEGAL AND THE PRAGMATICS OF WORLD-MAKING: NOMOSPEHERIC 
INVESTIGATIONS (2010) (exploring the significance of legal meaning in the production of 
spaces, Delaney looks at the conjunction of both performances of legality and material 
environment as relevant signifiers). 
47 Phil Hubbard, Roger Matthews & Jane Scoular, Legal Geographies—Controlling 
Sexually Oriented Businesses: Law, Licensing, and the Geographies of a Controversial 
Land Use, 30 URB. GEOGRAPHY 185, 187 (2009). 
48 Wallace & Brady, supra note 29, at 121. 
49 The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) acknowledges the legal 
impediments to the unionization of sex workers because on top of the issue of illegality, 
the “laws in Canada do not provide for the unionization of autonomous or contract 
workers where there is no defined employer/employee relationship.” CANADIAN UNION OF 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, SEX WORK: WHY IT’S A UNION ISSUE (Apr. 19, 2005), http://cupe.ca 
/EqualityPride/samesexworkbackgroundpaper. It also notes that this is particularly true for 
those in prostitution. Id. The CUPE position is to support decriminalization and does not 
necessarily include an agenda to organize sex workers. Id. 
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politics.50 Arguably the categorization of sex work as independent 
contracting conveniently resonates with the claim for individual 
sexual autonomy and sex workers’ agency in pro-sex work positions. 
Bruckert acknowledges the stakes of recognition, noting that: “[t]he 
organization of strippers’ labor is complex and defies easy 
classification. At the same time, to perceive the arrangement as an 
anomaly risks reaffirming its marginality by locating it outside of 
established labor practices.”51 
Indeed, because labor protection and the social protection benefits 
that come with the backing of the state and its agencies hugely depend 
on the legal recognition of exotic dancers’ labor, we can understand 
why Bruckert’s strategic approach, which highlights similarities 
between the work of exotic dancers and other skilled performers and 
professionals, makes practical political sense. Like other feminist 
scholars, she underscores a critique of “legalization.” Van de Mulen 
and Durisin, for example, note that with legalization comes greater 
state regulation with consequences that many sex workers are not 
willing to take on, such as the loss of anonymity and control over 
their sexual transactions.52 Within pro sex work politics, 
“legalization” is often differentiated from “decriminalization” which 
implies a continuing resistance to state regulation, particularly 
prohibitive measures that both restrict and criminalize sex workers 
and/or their clients.53 
The key ideological difference between decriminalization and 
legalization is the social and political conception of the sex 
industry. With decriminalization, sex work is seen as work or as a 
job that requires, and is entitled to labor protections and industry 
guidelines. Legalization conversely looks at sex work as an 
inevitable and unfortunate aspect of society that should be 
controlled and policed to the greatest extent possible.54 
But as Jane Scoular observes, while such neat categorizations aptly 
describe general political and social aspirations, inevitably huge gaps 
will exist between the objectives and the modes of intervention.55 
 
50 Adrienne Couto, Clothing Exotic Dancers with Collective Bargaining Rights 38 
OTTAWA L. REV. 37, 52 (2006). 
51 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 66. 
52 Van der Muelen & Durisin, supra note 26, at 306. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 306–07. 
55 Scoular, supra note 25, at 13. 
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Despite a situation of de facto or partial decriminalization,56 the 
recognition of sex work as labor that is entitled to protection remains 
both a difficult undertaking and a complex issue, considering that 
within labor law and policy itself the fundamental question of how to 
frame entitlement to labor protection is quite problematic. As Judy 
Fudge notes: 
The precarious situation of many of the self-employed squarely 
raises the question of whether the exclusion of self-employed 
workers from labour [sic] and social protection can be justified. One 
of the central purposes of labour [sic] law is to protect vulnerable 
workers and it is clear that many self-employed workers are 
vulnerable and in need of protection.57 
Moreover, as feminist scholars of labor point out, “[t]he 
overcrowding of women into a limited number of occupations and 
their greater presence in hard-to-organise [sic] areas, such as small 
business and part-time work, means that they tend to be in a poor 
bargaining position.”58 
 
56 See infra Part III. The regulatory turn to licensing strip clubs as “adult entertainment 
businesses” occasioned a shift in the legal regulation of stripping in Canada—that is from 
Federal policing through penal law to Provincial policing under the rubric of licensing. 
While the penal law prohibitions on public nudity as well as “nude performances” remain 
in place in the Federal Criminal Code, most of these provisions are no longer used against 
nudity/stripping in the context of strip clubs. Crown prosecutors mainly relied on the 
“bawdy house” provisions of the penal code, which were intended for prostitution, to file 
charges against establishments when they began offering new types of services like lap 
dancing in the 1990s. For a discussion of the shift from Federal to Provincial regulation, 
see also DEBORAH R. BROCK, MAKING WORK, MAKING TROUBLE: PROSTITUTION AS A 
SOCIAL PROBLEM (1998). 
57 Judy Fudge, Self-Employment, Women, and Precarious Work: The Scope of Labor 
Protection, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE 
TO LEGAL NORMS 201, 219 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006). Scholars note 
the role of courts in shaping the distinctions between full-time and part-time labor or 
regular employment and self employment (independent contracting) as the relevant 
categories in determining entitlements to social protection for workers (e.g., benefits and 
the right to collective bargaining). On the other hand, the availability of social rights 
regardless of labor participation or the thesis of “decommodification” has been recently 
revived and raised in the particular case of migrant women workers. See HABIBA ZAMAN, 
BREAKING THE IRON WALL: DECOMMODIFICATION AND IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S LABOR 
IN CANADA (2006). 
58 Laura Bennet, Women and Enterprise Bargaining: The Legal and Institutional 
Framework, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 112, 113 (Margaret 
Thornton ed., 1995). 
2012] Profiteers of the Bump and Grind 217 
A. Canadian Association of Burlesque Dancers v. Algonquin 
Tavern (1981) 
In 1979, the Canadian Association of Burlesque Entertainers 
(CABE) was recognized by the Canadian Labor Council and became 
a chartered local union (Local 1689), the only union-backed 
association of dancers in Ontario. CABE filed applications for 
certification claiming recognition in order to become the union 
representative of burlesque dancers working at various taverns and 
hotel bars across Ontario. In order to determine whether the dancers 
that CABE sought to represent were entitled to collective bargaining 
rights, the Ontario Labor Relations Board (ONLRB) determined 
whether dancers who had worked for or were working at the four 
named establishments qualified, either as employees or dependent 
contractors, by inquiring into the “functions” of the dancers. Only two 
of the four named establishments took active part in the proceedings 
through counsel, namely the Waverly Hotel and the Algonquin 
Tavern. 
In its decision, the Board reviewed four tests that had been created 
and used by courts: (1) the “control test”59 which courts have 
traditionally defined as “the degree of control exercised by the master 
over the manner in which the servant performed his work,” (2) the 
“fourfold test”60 which added ownership of the tools of labor, the 
chance of profit and the risk of loss to the usual standard of control, 
(3) the “organization and integration test,”61 which addressed the 
limitations of the fourfold test by focusing instead on whether the 
work or service being performed was integral to an organization and 
not merely an accessory to it, and (4) the “statutory purpose test,”62  
which draws significantly from U.S. case law in emphasizing that the 
legislative purpose must outweigh technical legal classifications. Not 
surprisingly, the board cited much difficulty in categorizing the work 
relationships at hand. After surveying the various “tests” applied and 
developed by the courts, the board noted: 
Despite the undoubted authority of the cases in which they were 
enunciated, the value of these “tests” lies solely in their utility, in 
 
59 See Denham v. Midland Employers’ Mutual Assurance Ltd., [1955] 2 Q.B. 437 
(U.K.); see also Ready Mixed Concrete (S.E.) Ltd. v. Minister of Pensions & Nat’l Ins., 
[1968] 2 Q.B. 497 (U.K.). 
60 Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (appeal taken 
from Can.). 
61 Stephenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd. v. MacDonald & Evans, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 101 
(U.K.); Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. v. Slatford, [1953] 1 Q.B. 248 (U.K.). 
62 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 128 (1944). 
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assisting the Board to reach a conclusion which is fair both to the 
statute, and the context under review. Usually the Board’s own 
jurisprudence is equally is [sic] useful—and herein lies a problem. 
Trade unions have been active in the entertainment industry for 
many years, but we were unable to find any exact parallel with the 
present case—perhaps because the transitory nature of the work 
relationships, and the multiplicity of employees has [sic] heretofore 
prevented the development of collective bargaining.63 
The Board ended up dismissing the applications in relation to three 
establishments and ordered further inquiries into the fourth 
establishment, which did not participate in the procedure. With the 
exception of two cases in which the dancers were house girls whose 
relationship with the tavern resembled full-time employment, the 
Board categorized the dancers as “independent contractors.” Soon 
after the ruling, CABE folded. While there are continuing efforts to 
explore collective bargaining as a means of securing labor protection 
for exotic dancers, those who do support the move are also the first to 
note the various limitations of this strategy.64 
III 
UNMAPPING THE LABOR SITES OF EXOTIC DANCING: THE 
CHANGING MODES OF WORK AND PAY IN EXOTIC DANCE 
Capital fragments the social . . . to extract value.65 
In its Algonquin decision, the ONLRB grappled with both the 
“transitory” character of most of the dancers’ employment and at the 
same time reflected on the relationship that dancers’ performances 
bore in relation to the business of club and establishment owners. 
While it recognized that a regular change of performers was a 
consistent requirement of the business, and that most dancers were 
transient workers, it also reached the conclusion that the performances 
themselves were not really integral to the primary businesses of the 
tavern and hotel owners.66 
The [t]ransitory nature of the work relationship is related to the 
number of sources of work “on the circuit”, and the desire of each 
 
63 Canadian Labour Congress (Canadian Association of Burlesque Entertainers, Local 
Union No. 1689) v. Algonquin Tavern, [1981] CanLII 812 (Can. Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd.). 
64 Couto, supra note 50, at 49–52. 
65 PRECARIAS A LA DERIVA, A VERY CAREFUL STRIKE: FOUR HYPOTHESES § 2 (Franco 
Ingrassia & Nate Holdren trans., 2006), available at www.commoner.org.uk/11deriva.pdf. 
66 Algonquin, 1981 CanLII at 812; see also Suzane Bouclin, Bad Girls Like Good 
Contracts: Ontario Erotic Dancers’ Collective Resistance, in VICTIM NO MORE: 
WOMEN’S RESISTANCE TO LAW, CULTURE AND POWER 46, 46–50 (Ellen Faulkner & 
Gayle Macdonald eds., 2009). 
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hotel or tavern to please their clientele by providing new faces 
every week. Many of the hotels have a regular core clientele who, it 
was suggested, would become bored if the same act was constantly 
repeated. The character of the dancing being what it is, the audience 
apparently demands a regular change of performers.67 
It should be noted that at the time of this decision in 1981, the site of 
exotic dancing had more or less already shifted from theatres as the 
main site of performances to taverns and bars run by hotels. Robert 
Fulford’s popular account of a burlesque performance68 at the Victory 
Theatre in 1965 describes a period in Toronto when the strip tease 
was primarily a staged performance and the patrons were a paying 
“audience” who literally bought tickets to watch the show in 
theatres.69 Worth noting too is that, even then, the contractual 
relationship of employment between the owner of the theatre and the 
dancers already had the combined features of an independent contract 
(since the performers were usually neither “full time” nor “exclusive” 
to theatres) but also included some of the distinguishing 
characteristics now associated with regular employment contracts 
such as applicable employment rates based on standards set by 
unions.70 As noted earlier, many of the dancers were also foreigners—
mostly Americans who travelled and performed as members of a 
circuit. Indeed, while these employment arrangements were anything 
but regular compared to other industries, they did not necessarily 
preclude a mechanism for standardizing dancers’ fees. Bruckert 
suggests that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it could easily be 
argued that the financial compensation strippers received was 
consistent not only “with the scarcity of their skills and other 
attributes brought by them to the market place,” but also their 
willingness and capacity to transcend the traditional propriety and 
social norms of public nudity.71 
 
67 Algonquin, 1981 CanLII at 812. 
68 This type of strip show (known by what has become arguably a more respectable 
name, ‘Burlesque’ is still popular and has gained a broad following and revival in recent 
years. For more on the history of Burlesque in Canada, see BECKI L. ROSS, BURLESQUE 
WEST: SHOWGIRLS, SEX, AND SIN IN POSTWAR VANCOUVER (2009). 
69 Robert Fulford, Robert Fulford on Burlesque, TORONTO DAILY STAR, Feb. 1965, 
available at http://pagesofthepast.ca/GetImage/GetImage.asp?ID=1553332&ZyNetId=; 
see also ROBERT FULFORD, CRISIS AT THE VICTORY BURLESK: CULTURE, POLITICS & 
OTHER DIVERSIONS 155–59 (1968) [hereinafter CRISIS]. 
70 CRISIS, supra note 69, at 158 (Fulford describes the pay scales of exotic dancers 
briefly in his article and notes that the negotiated union minimum was $166.50 a week, for 
seven days, four hours a day.). 
71 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 96. Feminist scholars departing from the orthodox 
Marxist use of prostitution as the ultimate metaphor for exploitation have offered more 
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It should be noted that at the time of the ONLRB’s decision, 
legally combining alcohol and nudity in the same space as a 
commercial endeavor had only been allowed in the Province of 
Ontario for the previous seven years, when recreational facilities, 
university and college canteens, and theatres, became eligible for 
liquor licenses through an amendment of the Liquor License Act in 
1973.72 Unlike Toronto’s then newly minted “adult entertainment 
businesses,” the sale of liquor had long been regulated under a 
licensing scheme at both the Federal and the Provincial government 
level since legal prohibition.73 At the onset, a licensing regulatory 
framework, which ostensibly but not technically speaking overtook 
the Federal Criminal law regulation of various aspects of commercial 
sex, had to be distinguishable from moral/criminal law policing in 
order to be upheld as a legitimate exercise of Provincial authority. 
Thus, creating the businesses category “Adult Entertainment” within 
a Municipal licensing scheme carved out a space of legality for a 
variety of commercial sex related establishments, including bars, 
restaurants, and hotels that featured stripping. 
Interestingly, however, once the primary site of labor shifted from 
theater to tavern, exotic dancers’ labor came to be viewed as merely 
 
complex explanations for the proliferation of sex work in the contemporary period. See 
EGAN ET AL, supra 17, at xx. (the Authors theorize the rapid increase of stripping in the 
United States (making note of the fact that in general, explicit sexual intercourse is not 
offered in strip clubs) and link it with the backlash against feminism, the predominance of 
women in workplaces, the sexualization of consumption, and the changing patterns of 
mobility and intimate relationships); see also ELIZABETH BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY 
YOURS: INTIMACY, AUTHENTICITY, AND THE COMMERCE OF SEX (2007). 
72 Ontario Regulation No. 614/73 (July 17, 1973) amending Regulation No. 563 (1970), 
Liquor License Act, S.O. 1973; see also Robert Campbell, DEMON RUM OR EASY MONEY: 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF LIQUOR IN BRITISH COLUMBIA FROM PROHIBITION TO 
PRIVATIZATION 50–55 (1991) (The liberalization of liquor regulation varied across 
provinces in Canada. Campbell notes that the British Columbia Liquor Control Board 
enforced a “no food, no entertainment, no dancing” policy in Vancouver’s Beer Parlors 
only until 1954. In Ontario, this policy was in place until the 1973 amendment.). 
73 The regulatory history of alcohol in Canada is in itself a complex topic and closely 
linked with the regulation of adult entertainment, specifically pubs and restaurants that 
also happen to be liquor license holders. Vice Squads commonly targeted the combination 
of liquor sales and nude entertainment in the era of liquor prohibition in Canada. Liquor 
prohibition and later regulation policies became more varied across Provinces in Canada, 
especially after World War II, and started shifting from prohibition to regulation in the 
1960s. In 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the authority of provincial liquor 
license boards to regulate nude entertainment in strip clubs through the imposition of 
conditions under liquor licenses. See Rio Hotel Ltd. v. Liquor Licensing Board for New 
Brunswick [1987] 2 S.C.R. 59 (Can.). 
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adjunct to the primary business of beverage, food, and/or hotel 
services.74 As the ONLRB in Algonquin opined: 
The individuals here alleged to be employees are male or female 
burlesque entertainers, hired to entertain an audience by dancing 
and removing their clothing either to total nudity or a “G-string.” 
The respondents, and the alleged employers in these proceedings, 
are hotels or taverns who (sic) hire burlesque entertainers. There are 
at least 250 such establishments in the Toronto area, and a number 
of others in other cities and towns across the province. Their 
principal business is the supply of food, beverages, or 
accommodation to the public . . . Entertainment is an ancillary 
concern, which is provided solely to attract or hold customers, and 
is scheduled to correspond with the anticipated customer density 
(i.e. during lunch, dinner or evening periods).75 
The growing prevalence of strip shows in restaurants and bars, as well 
as hotels, happened around the same time as the regulatory shift from 
criminal-law-based policing to the regulation of “adult 
entertainment”76 under a Municipal licensing scheme, occasioned by 
the jurisdictional shift from federal to provincial regulation.77 The 
irony of this of course is that even when there came to be such a thing 
as adult entertainment parlors—“premises or part thereof in . . . which 
is offered services appealing to or designed to appeal to erotic or 
sexual appetites or inclinations,”78 establishments erstwhile serving 
food and/or drink or providing hotel accommodation could, unlike 
their “theatre owner” predecessors, actually claim that the work of 
dancers was merely incidental to their primary business.79 
Indeed, more than the ONLRB’s non-recognition of the 
employment relationships of exotic dancers with the establishments 
that hire them the relocation of the site of exotic dancers’ labor from 
theaters to taverns, which led to the classification of their 
 
74 Canadian Labour Congress (Canadian Assoc. of Burlesque Entertainers, Local Union 
No. 1689) v. Algonquin Tavern, [1981] CanLII 812 (Can. Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd.). The 
Supreme Court of Canada echoed this sentiment in Rio Hotel Ltd. v. Liquor Licensing 
Board for New Brunswick, noting that the performances were a “marketing tool” to boost 
the consumption of alcohol. [1987] 2 S.C.R. at 59 (Can.). 
75 Algonquin, 1981 CanLII at 812. 
76 TORONTO, ONTARIO, AN ACT TO AMEND THE MUNICIPAL ACT OF ONTARIO § 368b 
(9) (1978) (Can.). 
77 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 52. 
78 Toronto, Municipal Code, R.S.O. (1990) § 545-362 (Can.). Adult Entertainment 
Parlours are currently defined as any premises or part thereof in respect of which a license 
or permit has been issue and is in full force and effect pursuant to the provisions of the 
Liquor License Act § 129 at which is offered services appealing to or designed to appeal to 
erotic or sexual appetites or inclinations. 
79 Rio Hotel Ltd., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 59 (Can.). 
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performances as ancillary to the primary mode of profit, facilitated 
key transformations in the work (and work spaces) of exotic dancing 
undertaken by establishment owners—many of them practices which 
eventually emerged as the current day industry’s standards. 
The more commonly known strip clubs today, which offer their 
patrons an assortment of sexual services and erotic entertainment and 
designate separate spaces for on-stage performances, table dancing 
and private lap dancing within the club premises, are a far cry from 
the establishments (primarily pubs, restaurants, and bars in hotels that 
featured a stage for nude performances) which sprung up soon after 
the decline of burlesque in theatres. The proliferation and mere 
presence of scantily clad women in a strip club also sets it apart from 
other bars, and their presence also produces the strip club as a male 
space.80 While some clubs still offer their dancers wages and promise 
a guaranteed number of hours per shift,81 industry practices of 
charging freelancers fees to solicit dances in the club and/or to 
perform on-stage is an accepted practice. Unlike “house girls,” which 
have become a rarity, freelancers earn tips, but their services also earn 
the club fees charged to customers. Dancers themselves have to pay 
club fees, rationalized as rent, for access to the club and its 
customers.82 In many cases, they also shoulder the income of the club 
disc jockey.83 According to Bruckert, while the practice results in 
lowering labour [sic] costs, “freelancing also means that managers are 
faced with a highly unstable labor force and decreasing levels of 
control over [dancers].”84 Viewed this way, resorting to foreign 
sources for the labor force it requires emerges as a logical business 
strategy for the industry. 
Under Canada’s Temporary Foreign Workers Program (TFWP), 
employers are required to secure a positive Labour Market Opinion 
(LMO) from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 
(HRSDC) indicating a shortage of local labor, as well as demonstrate 
 
80 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 146 (Bruckert notes that the strip club is as a male place 
and the presence of women who enter the club for leisure can be problematic and they are 
suspect). But see Emile Blauche, Why I go to Strip, supra note 17. While there have been 
equivalent “male strippers” who perform in female and/or gay clubs since the 1970s, some 
clubs with female dancers, and which used to cater to an almost all-male clientele, have a 
growing female clientele. 
81 The back pages of Toronto’s popular weekly magazine NOW, features adult ads that 
include want ads from strip clubs in the Toronto area. Currently most clubs offer 
guaranteed hours and a minimum of thitry hours per week at $12.50 an hour. 
82 Bouclin, supra note 66, at 9–10. 
83 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 35. 
84 Id. at 65. 
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that efforts were made to recruit and hire local workers, in order to be 
able to hire foreign workers.85 Likewise, foreign workers need to 
submit their prospective employer’s LMO for their work visa 
application.86 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the HRSDC created 
an exemption for strippers with job offers from Canadian employers 
so that temporary work visas could be issued at the port of entry, 
facilitating an informal “stripper exchange program” between Canada 
and the United States.87 In 1997, this exemption became the focus of 
controversy when the media linked the ‘exotic dancer visa’ to 
trafficking.88 Citizenship Immigration Canada (CIC) promptly 
tightened the process of screening visa applications, resulting in a 
sharp decline in the overall number of exotic dancers visas issued.89 
Meanwhile, the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada maintains 
that the demand for foreign adult entertainers and the shortage of 
 
85 Immigration Act, 1976–77, c. 52, s. 1 [Can.], 1976. Canada’s Temporary Foreign 
Workers Program (TFWP) category was created under the Non-Immigrant Employment 
Authorization Program (NIEAP) in 1973 under the auspices of the Immigration Act which 
was introduced in 1973 and adopted in 1976. The Immigration Act has been superseded by 
the Immigrant and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) (2002), S.C. 2001, c. 27, [hereinafter 
IRPA]. 
86 Id. Following the passage of IRPA, the Canadian government adopted additional 
criteria to assess the genuineness of employers’ job offers for temporary foreign workers. 
Employers can be deemed ineligible if, during the two years preceding a Labour Market 
Opinion (LMO) application, it is found that they have not provided wages, working 
conditions, or an occupation to a TFW that were substantially the same (STS) as the terms 
and conditions of the job offer, and for which a reasonable justification has not been 
provided. If an employer is found to have failed an STS assessment, access to the TFWP 
may be denied for two years. Likewise, under the new rules, temporary workers may only 
work for a total of four years (cumulative duration) followed by a mandatory four-year 
period of ineligibility. See Temporary Foreign Worker Program, HUMAN RESOURCES 
AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT CANADA, http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills 
/foreign_workers/pamphlet/ecr_pamphlet.shtml. 
87 The exemption emerged out of a practice of reciprocity between Canada and the 
United States and intended originally to facilitate touring or travelling dancers crossing the 
border to work. See Macklin, supra note 31, at 467. 
88 Id. at 474. 
89 Macklin notes that it is impossible to obtain official data from Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC) because the agency claims data is not desegregated from the 
general category of “Buskers” visas. Id. at 475. According to Tim Lambrinos, President of 
the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada (AEAC), the “unofficial” policy adopted 
since 1997 resulted in the decline of the number of visas issued for foreign exotic dancers. 
Between 2007 and 2008, Lambrinos claimed that only a total of seventeen were issued out 
of several thousand applications submitted to Canada’s embassies abroad. Letter from Tim 
Lambrinos, Executive Director of the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada 
(AEAC), Letter to the Members of the Standing Committee on Citizenship & Immigration, 
House of Commons, Canadian Parliament (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.adult 
entertainmentassociation.ca/ [hereinafter Letter from Tim Lambrinos]. 
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local workers is likely to continue.90 In 2009, the HRSDC adopted 
new guidelines for employers interested in hiring foreign workers as 
exotic dancers.91 Under the rules that were initially designed to make 
it harder for employers (and applicants) to secure a visa, club owners 
had to apply for, and secure, an individual LMO for each foreign 
exotic dancer that they intended to hire.92 The same rules, which at 
first also seemed to promise a modicum of protection for would-be 
exotic dancers,93 have now been superseded by a new anti-trafficking 
policy that totally bans foreign workers from exotic dancing as well 
as all other aspects of adult entertainment and sex work.94 New 
legislation adopted in March 2012 gives the Immigration Minister the 
power to prescribe protective measures for “foreign nationals who are 
at risk of being subjected to humiliating or degrading treatment, 
including sexual exploitation” and for the Tories, this means the 
authority to scrap the “exotic dancer visa.”95 
 
90 Letter from Tim Lambrinos, supra note 89. 
91 IRPA, supra note 84. 
92 EMPLOYER INFORMATION BULLETIN, HUMAN RESOURCES AND SKILLS 
DEVELOPMENT CANADA (Jan. 2010), http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/foreign 
_workers/ed/edbulletin.shtml#C. 
93 A model contract which outlined the obligations of the employer to the women 
employed as exotic dancers included, among others, provisions safeguarding against some 
of the most common forms of abuse by employers, such as recouping the costs of travel 
from the dancers’ pay and the non-payment of the agreed or advertized wage rate. See 
website of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC): 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/foreign_workers/fwp_forms.shtml; see also 
Instruction Sheet for Employers issued by the HRSDC: http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng 
/workplaceskills/foreign_workers/contracts-forms/contract-ed.shtml. 
94 Statutes of Canada, (Mar. 13, 2012) Bill C-10 An Act to enact the Justice for Victims 
of Terrorism Act and to amend the State Immunity Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and other Acts, § 206 
(1.2) Despite subsection (1.1), the officer shall refuse to authorize the foreign national to 
work in Canada if, in the officer’s opinion, public policy considerations that are specified 
in the instructions given by the Minister justify such a refusal and (1.4) The instructions 
shall prescribe public policy considerations that aim to protect foreign nationals who are at 
risk of being subjected to humiliating or degrading treatment, including sexual 
exploitation. See also Statutes of Canada, (June 18, 2012) Bill C-38, Jobs, Growth and 
Long-term Prosperity Act, which granted the Immigration Minister the additional authority 
to give his instructions retroactive effect. § 706 87.3 (3) (3.1) An instruction may, if it so 
provides, apply in respect of pending applications or requests that are made before the day 
on which the instruction takes effect. The new regulations implementing these changes are 
expected to come out in smmer 2012. 
95 In various public statements prior to the passage of the Bill, Minister Jason Kenney 
has made clear the Tories’ intention to scrap the visa for exotic dancers. See Jessica Hume, 
Strippers to be Stripped of Work Visas: Kenney, Ottawa Sun, June 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.ottawasun.com/2012/06/11/strippers-to-be-stripped-of-work-visa-kenney. 
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In a sense there will always be a shortage of new recruits in exotic 
dancing for the same reasons that the ONLRB noted—it is 
characteristic of the industry to require new dancers. Likewise by 
most accounts, very few women view the work as a long-term job,96 
and they find it extremely problematic to submit to regulatory 
schemes that will keep permanent records of their occupation.97 One 
aspect of the so-called “shortage” may be linked closely to the 
spatially re-ordered labor and space in strip clubs, which Bruckert 
aptly describes as the shift from the stage to the floor as the key labor 
site in the club. The floor as the main site of the club requires more 
dancers. While on-stage stripping remains a key activity in the club, 
and in general sets the atmosphere for the club, as far as most exotic 
dancers in Toronto are concerned, it is no longer the main job site 
because it is not where a dancer can make the most money. 
But the shifting modes of work and pay in stripping, from a more 
or less fixed wage or professional fee for a number of hours, to 
literally performing for tips solicited from customers means that these 
shifts also represent new possibilities both for maximizing earnings in 
cases and contexts where there is a lot of money to be made by way 
of tips, and also for further reducing and eliminating labor costs. And 
without assuming that upscale clubs make better employers or treat 
dancers better, real differences between workplace conditions and pay 
scales are not only connected to the strip club’s target clientele, but 
also to the types of services provided in clubs and the social location 
of dancers: 
Just as in the non-sex industry workforce, there is labor market 
segmentation with primary (higher wages, more stable) and 
secondary (lower paying, less stable) labor markets. Legal 
businesses with the most capital are the ones expanding and 
targeting more upscale customers and profitable markets. Primary 
labor markets benefit workers who already have the most resources 
and cultural capital. In the secondary labor markets the pay is likely 
to be lower and labor conditions worse. There is deep stratification 
among workers in the global sex industry. The nature of the product 
sold is evolving, too.98 
Bruckert’s study did not directly engage the issue of race and racial 
stratification but she acknowledges that the industry standard of 
beauty is the idealized image of a “blond, tall, well-endowed [white 
 
96 Bouclin, supra note 66 at 58. 
97 See, i.e., Couto, supra note 49. 
98 Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck, Marketing Sex: US Legal Brothels and Late 
Capitalist Consumption, 10 SEXUALITIES 425, 427 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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woman] with tan lines and without visible tattoos.”99 And even as 
strip club owners have often insisted that Canadian women are 
unwilling to take on the job,100 such a claim actually merits a closer 
investigation of industry practices in relation to its treatment of 
workers, particularly those in the margins. As pointed out earlier, the 
LACEV study documents how the period shortly after the migrant 
exotic dancer’s arrival, when they are most dependent on their 
employers, is also the time when they are most vulnerable to abuse.  
In several instances, those who were recruited to come to Canada 
reported that they were promised conditions of work and pay that 
often did not materialize: 
When we arrived we were paralyzed. We were hoping for 
something completely different. To start with, they told us that we 
were going to go to one of the most exclusive places in Toronto. 
Imagine, you think that you are going to go to a beautiful place, 
with all kinds of luxuries and when you arrive it is a place with a 
bad reputation. 
We thought the club was horrible . . . I saw it like the lowest of the 
low. There were bad looking clients and a lot of women. We are not 
going to make any money, I thought.101 
A consistent advertisement in the back section of Toronto’s NOW 
Magazine provides a curious clue about the variety of strip club 
practices in relation to modes of pay. Weekly ads by clubs promise 
dancers not only a set number of hours and a standard rate of pay, 
specifically for stage and table dancing, but also the opportunity to 
“keep all gratuities and tips.”102 However, as observers offering 
popular accounts of strip club culture in Toronto note, customers 
rarely ever tip stage and floor performers anymore for a variety of 
reasons.103 
 
99 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 33–34. 
100 Oziewicz, supra note 14. 
101 LACEV, supra note 11, at 40. 
102 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 59–60, 108. Bruckert also discusses how emphasizing 
tips as “extras” accompanied the reduction of wages. In the 1990s, dancers were offered 
the option of working for tips or not working at all. 
103 Popular accounts of strip club culture all over Canada note different practices in 
various Canadian cities. An American dancer blogged about her experience in Alberta 
noting the dangerous practice of tipping stage performers by tossing the two-dollar 
Canadian looney (a coin) onto a performer’s body. See Justice, In Canada: Stripper Rules 
are Decidely Looney, LAS VEGAS WEEKLY. Nov. 13, 2008, available at http://www.las 
vegasweekly.com/blogs/stripped/2008/nov/13/canaday-stripper-rules-are-decidedly           
-loony/. Anecdotal accounts from a friend who has visited a number of clubs in Toronto 
confirms most popular accounts also found on the internet which note that customer 
tipping (especially stage and table dance performers) is generally not a Toronto custom 
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Within the wider context of service work, gratuities and tips can be 
a buffer against dwindling rates of pay or a boon for workers 
subsisting on minimum wages. While this may be true for exotic 
dancers as well, in cases where the tip is the income itself, or when 
the rate of pay is less than the comparable minimum wage, working 
for tips in the context of stripping contributes to the further conflation 
of rewards and risks for dancers. Worse, not all dancers get to keep 
the full amount of gratuities that they receive from customers while 
working. Some dancers in the LACEV study reported that they were 
not allowed to handle money in the club and instead received “chips” 
from customers. 
We used to dance for chips. We could not have any money . . . at 
the end of the shift you could go to the office and they give you a 
piece of paper saying the amount of chips you made that day, but 
you do not see any money until the end of the month.104 
In the most extreme cases, clubs took fifty percent of the earnings 
from tips and gave twenty-five percent to the agent, leaving only 
twenty-five percent for the dancer. In others, women could keep their 
tips but were charged a daily quota by the club, regardless of the size 
of their earnings for the day.105 Bruckert notes that while practices 
such as withholding of pay and the imposition of fines are recognized 
as sometimes unreasonable, they are largely taken for granted by the 
industry’s working women, and she suggests that, on the margins, 
labor relations are perhaps shaped by the expectation that they will be 
exploitative.106 In the case of migrant exotic dancers in LACEV’s 
study, the pressure to accept the worst conditions of work and pay is 
directly linked to their severely restricted mobility as foreign workers, 
often compounded by the language barrier. 
A. Numerical, Skill, and Spatial Flexibility: A Continuum of 
Precariousness 
While other industries employ functional flexibility, that is, they 
vary the tasks of individual workers to suit their production needs for 
strip clubs, flexibility is part of what the product is: sexual services 
requiring new skills and tasks from the dancers themselves and 
 
although there rare exceptions such as visiting American tourists. See BARE FACTS, supra 
note 4. 
104 LACEV, supra note 11, at 38. 
105 Id. 
106 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 63. 
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closely tied to the diversification of both work spaces, performances 
and available services in the club premises. 
Bruckert’s account of the practices around stripping in the 1980s 
through the 1990s mentions on-stage “sets” for the dancers, as well as 
“working the floor” to solicit table or private dances, as already part 
of the routine that most dancers were expected to engage in.107 Before 
table and private or lap dancing became standard fare in strip clubs, 
the primary task of a dancer was dancing onstage and stripping. And 
before the ban on total nudity was lifted, some dancers still claimed 
that they merely provided the illusion of total nudity.108 
In the Algonquin case, the rationale behind the ONLRB’s 
classification of most dancers as independent contractors was its 
finding that dancers were solely responsible for their performances: 
The choreography, movements, arrangement, choice of music, and 
manner of performing are solely the creation of the dancer. The 
dancer supplies the tapes for her particular act or routine. The hotel 
plays them. There is little ongoing supervision or control, of (or 
even much interest in), the content of the performance, so long as 
the entertainer is on time. As Mona Pierson put it, her responsibility 
at the Algonquin was to “show up on time, do good shows and not 
bother the bartender.”109 
But while dancers were indeed responsible for their choreography, 
clubs also set expectations with regard to the content of dances and 
were in fact able to enforce the industry’s new demands by simply 
refusing to hire dancers who refused to conform. When CABE 
presented cases of dancers who were fired for their refusal to perform 
“obscene acts” or otherwise submit to the owners’ conditions in the 
certification cases, the ONLRB quite disingenuously, and not without 
a hint of moralistic bias, responded to what were clearly cases of 
unfair treatment by noting that the lack of consideration or respect for 
dancers by establishments was largely due to the transitory character 
of the job in a business where entertainment is not a primary concern, 
and where the dancers are virtually anonymous.110 The ONLRB went 
even further in noting that verbal abuse, while distasteful, was 
probably inevitable or came with the job territory because the 
“dancers market their sexuality, not just their dancing skills.”111 
 
107 Id. at 52–53. 
108 Id. at 64. 
109 Canadian Labour Congress (Canadian Assoc. of Burlesque Entertainers, Local 
Union No. 1689) v. Algonquin Tavern, 1981 CanLII 812, ¶ 24 (Can. Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd.). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. ¶ 34. 
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Indeed while it is one thing to acknowledge that the social context 
along with prevailing attitudes towards women, public nudity and 
sexuality will likely have an impact on the working conditions of 
exotic dancers, it is another matter altogether for an adjudicative 
agency of government to literally condone it.112 While a legally 
fashioned division between regular and transient employees does 
exist, the ONLRB’s comment frames dancers’ susceptibility to 
mistreatment as a logical consequence of what it seems to consider 
their self-degradation, for example, marketing their sexuality, which, 
as Margaret Radin points out is not unlike some feminist arguments 
against the market and the commodification of sex.113 
By the 1990s, it was clear that the requirements of the job were 
changing. While dancers were still responsible for their choreography, 
most clubs already required or expected their dancers to offer table, 
private or lap dancing on top of their stage performances. Bouclin 
recalls how in 1995 over two hundred dancers in Toronto, organized 
as the Association of Burlesque Dancers (ABE) and, led by Katherine 
Goldberg, lobbied the city to outlaw lap dancing.114 Following the 
passage of Toronto’s bylaw,115 the clubs reportedly blacklisted 
Goldberg and a number of dancers involved in the lobby.116 The 
ability of club management to pressure its dancers into performing 
acts beyond what they initially agree to do is actually a complex issue 
and one which, while certainly related to the vulnerability of 
individual dancers, the power of management over them, the evolving 
profit strategies of the industry, and even local law enforcement 
practices, is hardly ever a matter which can be resolved simply by 
 
112 The Ontario Labour Relations Board (the “Board”) was established by section 2 of 
the Labour Relations Act of 1948 and is continued by subsection 110(1) of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995. See Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c. 1 (Can.). The Board is an 
adjudicative agency of the Government of Ontario and its staff is appointed under the 
Public Service Act. The Board is an independent, adjudicative tribunal issuing decisions 
based upon the evidence presented and submissions made to it by the parties, and upon its 
interpretation and determination of the relevant legislation and jurisprudence. It plays a 
fundamental role on the labour relations regime in Ontario and encourages harmonious 
relations between employers, employees and trade unions by dealing with matters before it 
as expeditiously and as fairly as reasonably possible. See ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS 
BOARD, http://www.olrb.gov.on.ca/english/homepage.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
113 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE 
IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER THINGS 148 (1996). 
114 Bouclin, supra note 66, at 11. 
115 Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, By-law No. 129-95 (1995) (Can.). The bylaw 
was challenged in 1997 but upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. See Ontario Adult 
Entm’t Bar Ass’n v. Metro. Toronto Municipality (1997) O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. CA). 
116 Bouclin, supra note 66, at 12–13. 
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adopting more legal regulations or even by changing them, 
particularly when both the approach taken and the purpose behind 
regulation bear little relation to the safety and welfare of dancers.117 
As Bouclin observes, “the anti-lap dancing discourse produces and 
reproduces hierarchies among women occupying different social 
locations.”118 While migrant women, whose work permits bind them 
to specific clubs, restrict their mobility and set limitations to their 
available options, might experience more pressure to conform to club 
practices than non-migrants, the legal prohibition against lap dancing 
that exposes dancers to additional policing and penalties in the form 
of fines, can hardly be seen as diminishing their vulnerability. 
Arguably, it can even heighten it. With the adoption of the prohibition 
against foreigners in adult entertainment and sex work, even dancers 
who at least had legal status to work stand to lose it.119  
The LACEV study features a compelling account about how the 
requirement of lap dancing as part and parcel of migrant exotic 
dancers’ work is enforced, even as clubs manage to steer clear of 
incurring any liability under the bylaw against physical contact 
between dancers and patrons. While the very existence of VIP rooms 
in clubs clearly indicates that lap dancing and similar private 
performances are being promoted and offered by clubs, dancers in the 
study noted that they often received conflicting messages about such 
services from club management: 
They never tell you that you have to sit on the client, but that is 
what you see in the club. They do not say anything and everybody 
does lap dancing. But, they know it is illegal. When we come to the 
club they gather all the women and tell us not to do it. But, when we 
are alone they tell us to do it but carefully. We have to do it because 
otherwise we are not going to make any money. I know that you are 
not supposed to do lap-dancing, but, if you do not do it, you are not 
going to make any money. You have to sit on the client and let him 
touch you. We all do it.120 
 
117 Studies have noted how the reliance on criminal law as well as Municipal bylaws 
has worked to the disadvantage of dancers. In a study conducted between 1995 and 1998, 
researchers suggested the use of employment-standards law, human-rights law, 
occupational-health-and-safety law and workers-compensation law, to help control the 
sexual contact occurring in the clubs and the assault and other forms of violation reported 
by dancers. See JACQUELINE LEWIS & ELEANOR MATICKA-TYNDALE, NATIONAL 
HEALTH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM HEALTH CANADA, FINAL REPORT: 
EROTIC/EXOTIC DANCING: HIV-RELATED RISK FACTORS (1998). 
118 Bouclin, supra note 66, at 16. 
119 HUME, supra note 95. 
120 LACEV, supra note 11, at 47. 
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This attitude and modus operandi illustrates the legal acumen of many 
owners and managers in the enterprise owing in part perhaps to the 
fact that the industry is frequently prone to policing and crackdowns, 
occasioned by recurring moral panics.121 In 2007, a case against 
Zanzibar Circus tavern was again dismissed for lack of mens rea. The 
court noted that the word “knowingly” in the bylaw made the 
provision against physical contact a mens rea offence and thus 
required proof of “intention knowledge or subjective mental fault.”122 
In this case, the two police officers who posed as the club’s patrons 
were unable to provide evidence that one of the co-owners, who was 
present at the club, witnessed any of the violations of the bylaw or 
that he was willfully blind to their occurrence.123 The police officer 
who received a lap dance (and later claimed that the dancer placed his 
hands on her breasts twice and bit his crotch) had no recollection 
whether the co-owner ever went to the basement VIP rooms.124 But 
dancers who are charged with violations of both the criminal law125 
and Municipal bylaws usually do not bother to contest the charges 
laid against them—for a variety of reasons, one of them being the 
prohibitive cost of legal representation.126 Women in LACEV’s study 
reported experiencing police raids and getting fined, but also noted 
that club managers were tipped off prior to a raid and thus were able 
to warn their dancers beforehand.127 
 
121 It should be noted, however, that the industry is rather “pro-active” in its 
engagement of the law as well. 
122 Toronto v. Zanzibar Tavern Inc., [2007] ONCJ 401, (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.). 
123 Id. ¶ 212. 
124 Id. (neither of the two officers had sufficient recollection about the co-owner Wally 
Waterman’s movements, particularly whether he went to the basement VIP rooms or not, 
while they were in the club conducting surveillance). 
125 There are few cases involving dancers charged with indecency in a club or theatrical 
setting that have reached the Canadian Supreme Court. The last cases involving dancers 
performing strip shows wherein dancers were actually charged with a violation of the 
criminal law provision on public nudity were, in the case of a woman, Johnson v. The 
Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 160 (Can.), and in the case of a man, Queen v. Verrette, [1978] 2 
S.C.R. 838 (Can.). 
126 Zanzibar Tavern Inc. ONCJ at ¶ 5. The dancer, Nicole LaForge, charged in 
violation of the bylaw entered a guilty plea. At the time of the case the applicable penalty 
imposable would have been a fine. See Toronto Municipal Code Ch. 545-7 (A), art I. 
Under a subsequent Toronto By-law No. 126-2008, Appendix 1, Schedule B, the City 
adopted a demerit point system (imposable on top of the fines) under which a dancer 
receives the equivalent of two demerit points for violating the bylaw against physical 
contact: the Municipal Licensing and Standards Division will not renew a dancer’s license 
if the dancer has accumulated seven demerit points in the twelve months immediately 
preceding the application for renewal. 
127 LACEV, supra note 11, at 46. 
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IV 
POLICING THE PLACES OF COMMERCIAL SEX: FROM PASTIES AND 
G-STRINGS TO CHAMPAGNE ROOMS 
The “successful” transformation of the club space into a space of 
diversified sexual services and erotic entertainment may be 
understood as the combined outcome of state regulation and constant 
legal challenges mounted by establishment owners. As clubs have 
diversified the services and kinds of performances offered in their 
clubs, they have also been testing the outer limits of what the courts 
and the police were willing to tolerate. As such, establishment owners 
are consistently engaged in actively shaping the overlapping 
governable spaces on which their businesses were located. 
When licensing was first introduced through a handful of bylaws, 
taverns and hotels already offering nude entertainment did not view 
the regulatory shift as a move towards liberality at all.128 On the 
contrary, many establishment owners knew that the adoption of 
Municipal bylaws to regulate exotic dancing had come in the wake of 
local clean-up campaigns, which while aimed mainly at prostitution, 
also extended to prostitution-related activities.129 Local councils, 
whose members frequently voiced their disapproval of adult 
entertainment, usually sponsored such initiatives.130 One of the 
earliest challenges raised by establishment owners who were already 
in the business of featuring stripping and nude entertainment was filed 
in 1981, the year of the ONLRB decision.131 In Sharlmark Hotels Ltd. 
v. Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, the owner of Sharlmark 
Hotels challenged Ontario’s 1978 amendment to the Municipal Act, 
which gave municipalities the power to regulate “Adult Entertainment 
Parlors,” as ultra vires.132 
 
128 Licensing remains contested and adult entertainment owners have periodically come 
up with legal challenges against Municipal bylaws. The most recent challenge to the 
physical contact ban was in 2007. See Zanzibar Tavern, Inc. ONCJ at ¶ 5. Workers in this 
sector, on the other hand, are not always as well organized as workers from other sectors. 
For a discussion of the challenges to exotic dancers’ labor organizing, see Ross, supra note 
67; BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 100–01. 
129 BROCK, supra note 56, at  31–43. See also BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 53–55. The 
court made a similar observation in the Sharlmark case. See infra note 127 and 
accompanying text. 
130 BROCK, supra note 56, at 32–41. 
131 Canadian Labour Congress (Canadian Assoc. of Burlesque Entertainers, Local 
Union No. 1689) v. Algonquin Tavern, 1981 CanLII 812 (Can. Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd.). 
132 Sharlmark Hotels Ltd. v. Municipality of Metro. Toronto, [1981] 121 D.L.R 3d 415 
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.). 
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Establishment owners opposed the scheme mainly because they 
resisted the limitations on the types of nude entertainment they could 
provide, particularly since they were interested in “upping the ante” 
so to speak. In analyzing some of the outcomes of partial 
decriminalization on the working conditions of exotic dancers in the 
1970s, for instance, Becki Ross refers to a time when dancers in 
Vancouver experienced pressure from management to include 
“spreading” (opening the legs to display the female genitalia) in their 
performances: 
Along with the decriminalization of bottomless dancing emerged 
the trend towards full nudity and “spreading” to exhibit one’s 
unclothed genitalia. Indeed, the practice reflected bigger changes in 
the production and distribution of ever-more graphic depictions of 
female sexuality, including the films Deep Throat (1972) and 
Behind the Green Door (1973), the triple-X-rated magazines 
Penthouse and Hustler, both launched in the mid-l970s, and the 
mass distribution of adult films via the then-new VCR technology 
(Schlosser, 2003: 148). The new imperative that dancers “show the 
pink” touched off firestorm of protest, especially among dancers 
who began their careers with g-strings firmly in place.133 
By linking partial decriminalization in Vancouver to the trend 
towards raunchier strip-shows that came alongside the increased 
availability of sexually graphic pornographic films, Ross 
demonstrates an important point about the complexity of factors at 
work behind industry profit-making practices and their consequences 
for workers.134 Indeed, while the initial relaxation of criminal law 
“indecency” standards gave dancers some respite from a particular 
form of policing,135 it does not necessarily follow that all ensuing 
conflicts and battles “won” to push back regulation in adult 
entertainment have directly benefited exotic dancers, least of all, 
 
133 ROSS, supra note 67, at 335. 
134 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 52–53. 
135 As discussed earlier, the indecency provisions in the Criminal Code remain in place 
although authorities prefer to apply Municipal bylaws to regulate the adult entertainment 
business. A report for the Parliamentary Information and Research Service (PIRS) notes 
that “local police are in fact more likely to use municipal by-laws to regulate prostitution 
than to lay charges under the Criminal Code, given that it is easier to issue tickets for an 
infraction of a by-law than to collect evidence for a criminal charge. By-laws can also be 
more easily moulded to fit a local context.” In the same report, exotic dancing (which is 
also regulated through Municipal by-laws) is discussed separately as “prostitution-related” 
activity. See LAURA BARNETT, PROSTITUTION IN CANADA: INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, FEDERAL LAW, AND PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL JURISDICTION 23–25 
(2008), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0330-e 
.pdf. 
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foreign exotic dancers.136 As seen in the Zanzibar case, dancers 
continue to bear the brunt of policing as a result of regulations 
prohibiting physical contact between dancers and clients.137  
A. Shaping the Regulatory Discourse: The Spatial Logics of Liberal 
Policing 
Bouclin recalls that in 1979, when CABE argued before the city 
council to oppose licensing, they emphasized that “it would push the 
most marginalized dancers—older dancers and those with criminal 
records—out of the clubs into much more precarious street level sex 
work.”138 Notably, while CABE was decrying the pernicious effects 
of hyper-regulation on the most vulnerable dancers, most legal 
conflicts, as they were formulated within the dominant regulatory 
framework of policing and as industry owners argued them before the 
courts, drew more attention to the regulation of the visual spectacle—
performances and exposures of the female body or body parts—which 
in the liberal legal lexicon often emerges as the symbol, source and 
site of danger.139 
David Delaney observes, “liberal legal discourse is an 
embarrassingly rich source of spatial tropes and metaphors.”140 But in 
addition to its rhetoric, the administration of spaces, and particular 
bodies as spaces for regulation, is the sine qua non of liberal legal 
governance.141 That is, the regulation of what liberal law categorizes 
 
136 For a discussion of this see supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
137 See Zanzibar Tavern Inc., [2007] ONCJ 401 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.). 
138 Bouclin, supra note 66, at 6. 
139 See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW (1997). 
140 David Delaney, Beyond the Word: Law as a Thing of This World, in LAW AND 
GEOGRAPHY 67, 69 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003). 
141 Lisa E. Sanchez, Enclosure Acts and Exclusionary Practices: Neighborhood 
Associations, Community Police, and the Expulsion of the Sexual Outlaw in BETWEEN 
LAW AND CULTURE: RELOCATING LEGAL STUDIES 132 (David Theo Goldberg et al. eds., 
2001). Sanchez observes that legal practitioners have attempted to circumvent 
entanglement in the thorny legal questions raised by laws which effectively amount to 
treating sex work as a status offense by framing the issue as a problem of geography e.g., 
zoning vis a vis prostitution. While I agree with Sanchez’ observation regarding the tactic 
employed by politicians in the enactment of new modes of policing sex workers, I would 
add that historically, the question of status (legal and political inclusion and exclusion) in 
the liberal order, as well as the spatially oriented strategies of liberal law overlap and thus 
material and discursive, are simultaneous. See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries 
and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990) (Nedelsky’s insight about the 
“boundary as a central metaphor in the legal rhetoric of freedom” is one example that best 
describes the spatial sensibility of liberal law. Nedelsky’s work in political philosophy is 
familiar to legal geographers who also build on her work regarding the division-oriented 
character of liberal visions of autonomy.); Blomely, supra note 45, at 13, 208, 220. 
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as sexual has primarily been accomplished spatially, particularly 
through drawing and policing the boundaries of the public and 
private.142 In the case of exotic dancing or stripping, the spatial legal 
logic is arguably even more pronounced. Indeed, the regulation of the 
exposure of body parts and the female body as literal sites to be 
policed, as gleaned from both criminal law and licensing contexts, has 
also been about the control of the spaces where exotic dancing is 
featured.143 
The recent changes adopted in Canadian immigration law also 
demonstrate that liberal policing does not necessarily cancel out 
prohibitive regimes of regulation. Indeed, female bodies constitute a 
prominent site for regulating the sexual including the perceived 
dangers of sex, whether in relation to moral, political or bodily 
contagion because sexual purity is elemental and not exceptional to 
the liberal notion of progress.144  
In this case, foreign adult entertainment workers and sex workers 
have emerged as the default sites and ciphers to evoke these dangers 
and also for the state to regulate.145 The adoption of new anti-
trafficking measures which ban foreign workers from exotic dancing 
means that even licensed visa holders in sex related industries are 
now categorized as trafficking victims (or at least, potential 
trafficking victims).146 Under subsequent legislation empowering the 
Immigration Minister to wipe its backlog slate clean,147 the 
government’s “industry wide” ban effectively bars both the adult 
entertainment and sex work industry from accessing the Temporary 
Foreign Workers Program and consequently prohibits migrant 
workers from working in the same sectors.148 Minister Jason Kenney 
recently also announced that visa applications from those seeking 
employment in any sex related industry would no longer be processed 
beginning July 14, 2012.149 Under the same bill the Minister is also 
authorized to give his instructions retroactive effect, raising the 
 
142 Ruiz-Austria, Outside, Hidden and in Between, supra note 24. 
143 Carolina Ruiz-Austria, Baring, Veiling and the National Identity: Sex Politics in 
Canadian Legal Discourse, Conference Paper (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
144 MARIANA VALVERDE, THE AGE OF LIGHT, SOAP AND WATER: MORAL REFORM IN 
ENGLISH CANADA 1885–1925, 105 (2d ed., 2008). 
145 Ruiz-Austria, supra note 143. 
146 For a discussion of this, see supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
147 Kenney, supra note 32. 
148 Id. 
149 Supra notes 94–95. 
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possibility that even the visas issued to foreign workers in sex related 
industries (including exotic dancing) prior to the ban might be 
revoked even before they expire.150 The irony of course is that while 
these new policies have purportedly protective objectives, they 
effectively withhold (and threaten to withdraw) legal status from 
those whom the measures’ proponents deem vulnerable in the first 
place. Having abandoned its initial (albeit rather short lived) 
employment standards approach,151 the law’s prohibitionist turn may 
also be viewed in part as a reaction to recent gains by sex workers’ 
rights whereby the moral panic around the predominance of 
foreigners in Canada’s adult entertainment industry has been recast in 
terms of a clearly marked socio-political and legal distinction between 
autonomous Canadian women and their trafficked foreign 
counterparts.152 Women on the margins (sex worker and/or immigrant 
others) are convenient targets in projects of rule and are often treated 
not as subjects but rather as objects of regulation.153 The law uses 
their bodies discursively—as boundaries, sites and places to be 
managed.154 
The following cases outline a chronology of regulation and the 
resistances against them that focus exclusively on the visual spectacle, 
for example, female nudity—an account that resonates with the 
progressive narrative emphasizing the gradual toleration of nude 
entertainment in an era of sexual liberation. Ironically, it also echoes a 
kind of strip-tease logic: from monitoring hemlines, to the mandatory 
opaque and flesh-colored coverage, pasties, and finally, the doffing of 
the G-string. On one hand, the structuring logic of regulation here, 
controlling the body as a site, is hardly surprising for female bodies 
and specific female body parts remain the easiest as well as likely 
targets for both state and non-state regulation.155  
In Sharlmark Hotels Ltd. v. Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 
the owner of Sharlmark Hotels challenged Ontario’s 1978 
 
150 Bill C-10 An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the 
State Immunity Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act and other Acts, § 206, supra note 93. 
151 Regulations earlier adopted by the Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada (HRSDC) outlined additional procedures for visa applications but also included a 
number of worker protection oriented measures. See supra notes 91–93. 
152 Ruiz-Austria, supra note 143. 
153 Id. 
154 HYDE, supra note 139, 8–11, 258. 
155 Ruiz-Austria, Baring, Veiling and the National Identity, supra note 143. 
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amendments to the Municipal Act, which gave municipalities the 
power to regulate “Adult Entertainment Parlors” as ultra vires.156 
Sharlmark Hotels argued that the Province of Ontario infringed on 
Federal powers of legislation over criminal matters, in this case over 
matters concerning immorality, indecency and obscenity, when it 
authorized the Municipality to adopt a bylaw requiring burlesque 
entertainers to wear opaque clothing fully covering their pubic areas. 
In this case, it is worth noting that while the applicant opposed the 
City’s mandatory minimum dress code for strippers, it did so without 
necessarily framing the issue as one of free expression,157 for doing so 
would have squarely challenged the validity of existing criminal laws 
that prohibit various nude performances as indecent. Around this 
time, police permissiveness towards stripping was already the norm 
and even acknowledged by the Canadian Supreme Court,158 which 
meant that existing criminal law was rarely if ever used against strip 
clubs anymore. At the same time, establishment owners who were 
already providing various forms of nude entertainment were 
constantly devising their own ways of circumventing existing statutes 
that proscribed nudity. 
In a media interview, Terry Koumoudouros, one of two brothers 
who founded and operated the House of Lancaster in Toronto, 
bragged that they successfully evaded criminal law charges on nudity 
by making sure the dancers in his club performed topless first and 
then donned sports jerseys before taking off their bottoms.159 
Without having to question state authority to censor public nudity 
and nude performances, Sharlmark Hotels merely pointed out the 
Province’s lack of authority, invoking Federal jurisdiction over 
matters of morality by relying on a Supreme Court decision160 and an 
 
156 Sharlmark Hotels Ltd. v. Municipality of Metro. Toronto, [1981] 121 D.L.R. 3d 415 
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.). 
157 Prohibitions against public nudity and indecent performances have never been 
framed squarely as claims of free expression by establishment owners but in a handful of 
cases this aspect has been raised in addition to other arguments through the testimonies of 
actual performers who appeared as witnesses in cases filed by adult entertainment parlor 
owners. Courts have likewise avoided the issue. June Ross observes that, “the few 
Canadian cases that have dealt with the issue have dismissed or at least avoided the 
argument.” See June Ross, Nude Dancing and the Charter, 2 REV. CONST. STUD. 298 
(1994). 
158 Johnson v The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 160 (Can.). 
159 Daniel Dale, Terry Koumoudouros, 67: Strip Club Owner, TORONTO STAR, June 1, 
2007, available at http://www.thestar.com/News/article/220317. 
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Alberta Court of Appeal judgment161 which both declared provincial 
legislation forbidding ownership of slot-machines inoperative on the 
grounds that the statute was identical to Criminal Code provisions 
dealing with the same subject matter.162 In addition, they argued that 
the licensing fee was excessive and amounted to prohibition. Despite 
the novelty of their arguments, Sharlmark hotels lost the case and the 
Divisional Court of the Ontario High Court of Justice upheld both the 
Municipality’s G-string bylaw and the provincial law, which gave 
Municipalities in Ontario the authority to regulate “adult 
entertainment parlors.”163 The provincial court noted that the 
impugned legislation “expresses no moral or value opinion on adult 
entertainment parlors,” adding that the same “does not say or suggest 
that they are evil, immoral or obscene.”164 Rather than accept 
Sharlmark’s comparison with the bylaws banning slot machines, the 
court reviewed cases which tackled what it considered comparable 
legislation directed at licensing and regulating another booming adult 
entertainment business: body rub parlors.165 It pointed out that various 
bylaws regulating body rub and massage parlors, which required 
clothing for attendants in the cities of Winnipeg, Vancouver, and 
Edmonton, had already been upheld at the local provincial court and 
provincial appellate levels.166 Not without a bit of handwringing, the 
court upheld the Toronto bylaw.167 Quite interestingly, Judge 
Saunders, who wrote the court’s opinion in Sharlmark, openly 
expressed his reluctance to uphold the Municipal bylaw directing 
burlesque dancers to wear opaque coverage on their pubic area: “Not 
without some hesitation, I conclude that the provisions of cl. 28(2) are 
regulatory and within the powers of the municipality granted to it by 
s. 368b.”168 In obiter dicta, Saunders even speculated about the scope 
of lawful excuses that could be raised as a valid defense in a charge of 
nudity or partial nudity offensive to public decency.169 He noted that 
 
161 Regent Vending Machines Ltd. v. Alta Vending Machines Ltd. et al., [1956] 6 
D.L.R. 2d 144 (Can. Alta.). 
162 Sharlmark Hotels Ltd. v. Corp. of the Municipality of Metro. Toronto, [1981] 121 
D.L.R.3d 415 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Cal Investments Ltd. v. Winnipeg, [1978] 84 D.L.R. 3d 699 (Can. Man. C.A.); Try-
San International Ltd. v. Vancouver, [1978] 83 D.L.R. 3d 236 (Can. B.C. C.A.); Moffat v. 
Edmonton, [1978] 84 D.L.R. 3d 705 (Can. Alta. C.A.). 
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167 Sharlmark, [1981] 121 D.L.R. 3d at 415. 
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if the performer wore a scarf around her neck, the Crown would have 
the additional burden of having to prove offense to public decency 
and order.170 He opined: “In either case the defense of lawful excuse 
is available to the accused. Various situations come to mind with 
respect to lawful excuse such as models in art classes, swimmers in 
uninhabited areas, actors and actresses in theatrical performances and 
possibly, performers in licensed adult entertainment parlors.”171 
The Sharlmark ruling was famously overturned in the 1985 case of 
Koumoudouros et al. v. the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto172 
where the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed a provincial court ruling 
by holding that the bylaw in question was ultra vires. It even went so 
far to say that its earlier judgment in Sharlmark was wrong and 
should be overruled.173 The Koumoudouros brothers, founders and 
operators of The House of Lancaster in Toronto, built a reputation 
around their legal victory and have often touted it as a major 
achievement for the strip-club business.174 
When the brothers filed the case in 1984, they took inspiration 
from a case that many saw as a relaxation of the law against 
prostitution and prostitution-related activities in Canada and they 
were hoping to bank on the newly decided Supreme Court case of 
Westendorp v. The Queen.175 In the case of Westendorp, a Calgary 
bylaw prohibiting persons from remaining on the streets and/or 
approaching another person on the street for the purpose of 
prostitution was struck down as ultra vires not only for penalizing 
acts within the domain of Federal criminal law, but also for expanding 
the scope of the prohibitions within existing law.176 Emboldened by 
the Supreme Court’s libertarian ruling in Westendorp, the applicants 
argued that the central argument under Sharlmark could no longer 
hold.177 In rejecting the applicants’ claim, the court pointed out that 
the bylaws struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Westendorp “were not a part of any regulatory scheme falling within 
the legitimate provincial jurisdiction.”178 Standing firm by Sharlmark, 
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that in Sharlmark that the decision striking down the one bylaw does 
not throw the slightest shadow over the correctness of the other 
decision.”179 Yet within the same year of this decision by the 
provincial court, two cases were elevated to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal involving bylaws that purported to regulate states of dress and 
undress by employees of restaurants as well as lodging establishments 
and adult entertainment parlors in the City of Burlington and the 
Town of Markham, respectively.180 These two cases eventually led to 
the complete reversal of Sharlmark.181 When Sharlmark was 
overturned, Koumoudouros had to be reversed as well. 
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada began to consider 
criminal prosecutions of “nude shows” in strip clubs involving a 
variety of sexual services other than on-stage stripping in the tradition 
of burlesque, which, judging by current standards, may now appear 
less risqué than contemporary types of exotic dancing.182 As strip 
clubs experimented with a repertoire of business strategies along the 
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lines of spatially restructuring labor in the club,183 the Supreme Court 
was perhaps the first to notice an emerging regulatory conundrum; 
namely that these taverns were spaces which were not initially 
envisioned in the early criminal statutes on indecency. Justice Estey 
and Lamer made this interesting observation in the Rio case: 
Meanwhile, the Parliament of Canada, by a series of provisions in 
the Code, has legislated with respect to nudity (s. 170), indecent 
acts (s. 169), immoral, indecent or obscene performances in a 
theatre (s. 163), indecent shows in public (s.152 (2) (b)), and 
causing a disturbance in or near a public place (s.171). Some of 
these provisions relate to specified premises and others are made 
applicable at large. It may well be that Parliament could legislate 
with respect to conduct in taverns specifically as in the case of 
theatres, but there is no such provision in the Code at present and 
apparently no court has been required to answer this question thus 
far in our constitutional history.184 
In fact, two of three commonly cited Supreme Court cases involving 
strip clubs in Canada were criminal prosecutions for violating the 
bawdyhouse provisions of the criminal code. A bawdy house is 
defined as “a place that is (a) kept or occupied, or (b) resorted to by 
one or more persons for the purpose of prostitution or the practice of 
acts of indecency.”185 As it is worded, the statute was intended to 
address prostitution rather than stripping. In the 1993 case of 
Tremblay, the Court drew a legal line between public and private 
within the public space of the club. It held that the acts between 
consenting adults, the female performer and patron, took place behind 
closed doors, and that this meant that the acts were not a “blatantly 
public display.”186 At the same time, the Court accepted the testimony 
of a former employee that peepholes were used by management for 
monitoring and enforcing club rules against touching between 
 
183 BRUCKERT, supra note 7, at 36–37, 75–76 (noting the various changes of club 
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(Can.) (emphasis added). 
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performers and clients.187 Despite the mutuality of the exposure, the 
court in Tremblay fixated on the bodies of women and their actions as 
the locus of controversy.188 On one hand, the courts (especially at the 
Federal level) fulfill an important purpose when expressing their 
liberality and tolerance for nude performances: it showcases sexual 
liberty, the hallmark of a modern and Western liberal society. On the 
other hand, maintaining a focus on performing female bodies as the 
only “legally controversial” public displays,189 and a strategy of 
policing that redefines the boundaries of public and private through 
the regulation of female bodies remain consistent themes in liberal 
policing.  
The 1990s decisions in Tremblay,190 Mara East,191 and Pelletier192 
by the Supreme Court of Canada may be considered somewhat iconic 
of the various spatial experiments undertaken by clubs during the 
period. In Tremblay, the Pussycat club in Montreal offered its clients 
an exclusive show inside private rooms within the club in which 
dancer and patron masturbated in each other’s presence.193 In the case 
of Mara (1997), Cheaters club in Toronto challenged the boundaries 
of the city’s no-contact prohibition by offering lap dancing as well as 
varied forms of intimate contact in the club.194 Finally, by 1999 in 
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Some studies mention that clubs monitor their dancers to keep track of the tips they earn 
during private dances. See, e.g., R. Danielle Egan, Eyeing the Scene: The Uses and 
(RE)uses of Surveillance Cameras in an Exotic Dance Club, 30 CRITICAL SOC. 299 
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management. See Bruckert, supra note 7, at 60–66. 
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189 Tremblay, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 932. The majority made a mere passing reference to the 
normality of male masturbation—citing expert evidence—in relation to the male patrons’ 
acts of “display,” a fact only noticed by the Justices dissenting from the majority. Id. This 
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Pelletier, the club’s dancers were performing lap dances in semi-
shielded cubicles.195 
A cursory reading of the Tremblay, Mara, and Pelletier cases 
might give the impression that nudity in strip clubs is no longer a 
potential legal issue and that physical contact between dancers and 
patrons is the latest discursive space on which legal battle lines are 
currently being debated. While this is partly true, that is, broadly 
speaking on the level of dominant public perception, it may well be 
reflective of liberal attitudes shared by the police, the crown and even 
the judiciary. As far as the law and the ruling of the Supreme Court in 
Rio Hotel Limited v. New Brunswick stand, provinces retain the power 
to regulate and presumably even ban nude shows within the 
regulatory context of liquor licensing.196 
Within this legal discourse of state regulation and resistance that 
concentrates around female nudity, exotic dancers’ bodies emerge as 
regulatory objects, but the dancers themselves are not legal 
subjects.197 CABE’s version of resistance to municipal licensing, as 
well as its account of the club owners’ emerging practice of upping 
the risqué content in dancers’ performances, was waylaid mostly 
because none of its claims (which echoed workers’ concerns and 
employment standards) properly fit the regulatory framework. In turn, 
CABE’s bid, along with other feminist attempts to fall back on the 
same regulatory logic in hopes of representing dancers’ interests 
(when they lobbied in favor of the G-string bylaw and later the no-
contact prohibition), cost both the leadership and dancers’ 
associations considerable losses to their credibility.198 
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B. Layers of Policing and Hyper-regulation 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Rio Hotel Limited v. 
New Brunswick199 came just two years after the Ontario Court of 
Appeal ruling that in effect struck down the city’s prohibition on 
nudity in clubs. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of 
conditions imposed on a strip club, this time by the New Brunswick 
Liquor License Board (NBLLB), on holders of valid entertainment 
licenses.200 The license terms included, among other conditions, that 
“the board will not approve nude entertainment or other types of live 
entertainment that in any form or manner exposes to public view the 
genital areas or buttocks of a male performer or the genital areas or 
buttocks or breasts of a female performer.”201 In obiter dicta Justice 
Estey of the Supreme Court noted in a separate minority opinion with 
Justice Lamer that the Court of Appeal for Ontario was in error in the 
cases of Koumoudouros, Sherwood, and Nordee.202 The conditions 
against nudity were similar to the earlier bylaws issued in the Greater 
Toronto Areas of Burlington and Markham, but this time they were 
incorporated into the liquor license as terms and conditions for 
holding a liquor license. Liquor licensing is an additional, and 
extremely dense layer of Provincial regulation, but it is still very 
much in keeping with the features of liberal policing. 
Within Canadian jurisprudence, the “licensing justification” is a 
principle often utilized by the Supreme Court of Canada as a rationale 
for differentiating between regulatory and pure-crime offenses.203 
This principle provides that the person who chooses to participate in a 
regulated activity accepts the responsibilities which attach to the 
regulated activity and that “the protection awarded through regulation 
comes at a price of reduced liberties.”204 Indeed, despite their initial 
resistance when the state, through the Provinces, turned to licensing 




201 In addition to an apparent ‘prohibition,’ the terms of the liquor license in issue also 
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owners, particularly strip club operators, continue to challenge and 
contest the licensing authority of the provinces over their 
businesses.205 While both owners/operators of strip clubs and the 
exotic dancers are required to secure licenses from the City of 
Toronto,206 as the results of implementing the no-contact policy 
demonstrates, they do stand on very different sides of the risk 
management framework as far as the adult entertainment business is 
concerned.207 Despite the variety of employment and contractual 
arrangements, exotic dancers are subject to the control of club owners 
through a variety of house rules often accompanied by a system of 
fines.208 At this point, it is worth noting that the interests of 
establishment owners and exotic dancers will not necessarily always 
be at odds. Obviously, a club’s popularity can enhance earning 
opportunities for its dancers.209 Sometimes and particularly when it 
serves their interests, clubs also provide dancers with legal counsel.210 
Recently club owners have started campaigning for the repeal of 
the bylaws against physical contact, as well as calling for reforms in 
the city’s licensing requirements.211 This time, club owners are 
pointing out that the regulations perpetuate a stigma, which exotic 
dancers endure.212 At a Toronto City Hall Council Committee meeting 
wherein a dancer performed a pole dance before Councilors, Tim 
Lambrinos, the executive director of the Adult Entertainment 
Association of Canada (AEAC) even noted that “they [dancers] get 
abused by the bylaw officers and sometimes police, because the 
 
205 Apart from filing cases to challenge Muncipal bylaws and Provincial authority, the 
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current laws are vague and are allowing women to be mistakenly 
called into the court.”213 While such a high level of concern for their 
workers’ welfare may not have exactly been a strong card for this 
industry in the past, it is not entirely implausible for the clubs to 
express an interest in improving the dancers’ working conditions.214 
In the context of newly adopted immigration restrictions that may 
have an impact on the available workforce, their efforts may also be 
seen as a pragmatic business move that may help clubs attract more 
Canadian workers.215 
C. In between Politics and Law: Migrant Women in/out of the Mix 
While subject to additional regulation as businesses, strip clubs as 
employers have been left considerably freer to adopt a variety of 
strategies to reduce, and in some cases eliminate the costs of dancers’ 
labor altogether. Facilitated initially by the “displacement” of 
strippers’ labor that occurred with the introduction of legal 
amendments in liquor licensing and by the legal classification of 
dancers’ labor as ancillary to their business by the ONLRB, (a view 
reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada), establishment owners 
have pursued profit schemes echoing the tactics of many businesses in 
the period of deindustrialization e.g., labor flexibility, the spatial 
restructuring of labor and diversification often with paradoxical 
results, one of them being that whatever the actual business (e.g., 
restaurant, bar or sports pub with strip shows), female nudity and the 
promise of it has now more than ever become the undeniable draw of 
this class of entertainment, which in turn requires many established 
strip clubs to continuously recruit more dancers. Arguably, without 
the proliferation of scantily clad and naked female bodies on the floor, 
a strip club is just another pub with too much lighting equipment and 
superfluous cubicle spaces. Likewise, the shifting modes of pay, 
coupled with policing strategies like the no-contact prohibition, 
further conflate the rewards of the job with the assumption of risks, a 
 
213 Id. 
214 Supra notes 120–26 and accompanying discussion. 
215 Club owners have also made statements about recruiting international students in 
anticipation of a shortage of workers. While the purpose of the statement appears to be an 
attempt to force the government to rethink its ban, the move also openly acknowledges an 
available loophole. International students with open work visas can work part-time. Anti-
trafficking proponents of prohibition have called for even more absolute applications of 
the ban to include international students. Bill Curry, Ottawa Brings Down Curtains on 
Foreign Strippers, Globe and Mail, July 4, 2012, available at http://www.theglobeand 
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risk not seen elsewhere except the financial markets, albeit with far 
from comparable rates of reward or risk,216 and heighten the 
vulnerability of those working in the margins. As LACEV notes, if 
the concern with lap dancing is to prevent harm, especially to women, 
the current regulatory schemes have been anything but effective.217 
Like other businesses dependent on a transient labor force, strip 
clubs in Toronto increasingly rely on the labor of temporary foreign 
workers to boost the bottom line. But while club practices vary across 
the board (not all clubs’ contractual terms qualify as criminal, let 
alone as exploitative from the perspective of dancers), strategies 
which either target migrant sex workers as victims,218 or worse, those 
that purport to bar or limit the entry of migrant women interested in 
employment in Toronto’s clubs,219 fail to consider the punitive effects 
of such police-led and anti-trafficking approaches on the women 
themselves. And while they do not impose additional penal provisions 
per se, the latest round of immigration policy changes certainly have 
serious consequences for those who face losing their legal work 
status.220 Even the AEAC, in seeking to distance itself from the 
seamier elements of the industry, warns that Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada’s (CIC) “blockade of foreign exotic dance 
entertainers has . . . produced a phenomenon that has inadvertently 
coerced a creation of a ‘loophole’ pathway that will allow a 
prospective dancer to work in Canada without a temporary work visa 
(i.e. a Student Visa).”221 
William Rountree observes that “(i)n addition to shifts in law and 
policy, the evolution of sexual commerce was also intimately tied to 
transformations in the spatial contours of life in industrializing 
cities.”222 The AEAC estimates that Canadians make twenty-three 
 
216 Dancers, after all, take on risks themselves unlike most traders or financial 
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million visits to adult entertainment establishments annually.223 In 
fact, scholars note that the terminology shift heralded by the legal 
regulation of “adult entertainment” was itself partly an 
acknowledgement that sex businesses occupy a central place in the 
leisure economy of many Western cities.224 
Penelope Saunders also notes that: 
For the overwhelming majority of female migrants, it is not brute 
force, pure deceit, or random abduction that propels them to engage 
in sexual labor, but rather the desire for economic, social, and 
geographic mobility, the potentially pleasurable aspects of being an 
object of affection and desire, and the allure of flexible schedules 
and instant cash.225 
Instead of taking the presence of migrant women exotic dancers in 
Canada and the reliance on a migrant labor workforce in Toronto’s 
commercial sex sector as an emerging complication to liberal 
inclusion in Canada and an occasion for moral panics, approaching 
the employment of migrant exotic dancers in Toronto as an already 
existing “scheme of human association” or “social existence”226 with 
an element of pragmatism227 helps to counter the hypocrisy around 
recurrent moral panics which invariably lead to additional restrictions 
being imposed on persons in sex work, and more particularly on 
lower income or foreign sex workers and/or their clients.228 But while 
taking the pro-sex work position seriously requires an element of 
pragmatism, it should also include an acknowledgement of the 
limitations and contradictions that arise from it. We should take heed 
not to fall into what Sophie Day calls “an extraordinary valorization 
of what looks like precarious and limited autonomy.”229 Hierarchy in 
 
223 Letter from Tim Lambrinos, supra note 89. 
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status as well as stratification in the types of work, conditions, and 
pay certainly prevails among workers in both the adult entertainment 
industry and commercial sex work, but this is not necessarily all 
conditioned by markets or patriarchal culture. A spatial account of 
law demonstrates that the relationship between regulations and their 
purported regulatory objectives can be quite complex. In 1981, 
Jeffrey Weeks lamented that “theoretical insights to explain the 
relationship between capitalism and sexuality have shown a notable 
paucity of insight.”230 This is not to suggest, however, that capitalism 
or neoliberalism has had a uniform effect on sexual relations, let alone 
on sexual regulation. As Weeks observes, “(c)apitalism did not create 
a personality type to fit its needs, much less a sexual morality that was 
essential to the success of capital accumulation.”231 
He notes that the articulation between sexual mores and capitalism 
occurs through complex mediations through moral agencies, political 
interventions, and diverse social practices whose histories still need to 
be uncovered.232 Unfortunately advocates of rescue-minded missions 
intent on uniformly categorizing migrant women working in adult 
entertainment or those engaging in sex work as trafficking victims, 
only make things worse by relying on legal strategies which reinforce 
state (and police) power over those who are already lacking in 
power.233 The revival of prohibitionist approaches using immigration 
law and the withdrawal of work legal status discursively positions 
foreign sex workers outside the ambit of legal subjecthood and casts a 
pall over race-integrated cultures of public sex.234 Curiously, the 
measures also end up introducing a legally inspired cultural taboo on 
sexual dealings of a commercial nature between Canadians and Non-
Canadians.235 
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Over the past thirty years, feminist scholars236 have made key 
observations about the transformations around the immaterial aspects 
of domestic labor, including the sale and purchase of intimacy and sex 
in the context of the global economy.237 The types of services offered 
in Toronto’s clubs today, as well as the workers that the industry and 
its patrons rely on to provide them, present a particularly compelling 
case for examining the blurred boundaries between immaterial and 
productive labor in the postindustrial setting, not only because the 
type of work and services offered in strip clubs demonstrates the 
comingling of intimacy and commerce in a novel albeit not 
necessarily separate form from prostitution, but also because the 
exchange is constituted by and in turn constitutive of wider global 
economic transformations. Elizabeth Bernstein aptly describes these 
changes as the “spatial, social and emotional privatization of sexual 
labor.”238 As regulatory lines are re-drawn, even club owners now 
decry the harmful effects of the ban on foreign exotic dancers but also 
note its impact on the industry’s labor pool.239 Ironically, a labor 
shortfall, if it does occur, may well open up opportunities for 
negotiating better working conditions by the local work force.240 
Indeed the continuing importance of collective forms of workers 
action cannot be discounted, but approaches which fall back on 
legitimating labor and social protection for sex workers solely 
through collective bargaining processes, without questioning the 
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underlying divisions and hierarchies241 often built into such claims, 
can end up reinforcing those divisions. 
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